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Interpreting others’ emotions is theoretically foundational for children’s social 
competence, yet little research contrasts Emotion Understanding (EU) types against 
their theoretical correlates. This study investigated kindergartners’ situationistic EU 
(attributing emotions based on external events) and mentalistic EU (attributing 
emotions from others’ mental states) in relation to Theory of Mind (ToM) and social 
skills, as rated by parents and teachers. The EU measures were expected to have low 
associations with one another and to relate differently to ToM and select social skills. 
Mentalistic EU was expected to be an important predictor of teacher-rated social 
skills. Results supported the hypothesis that mentalistic EU and situationistic EU are 
distinct constructs. However, both relate to ToM. Furthermore, while ToM and 
situationistic EU variables were included in the regression model, only vocabulary 
and mentalistic EU were significant predictors for teacher-rated social skills. Results 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Social competence is vital to the level of development that a child needs to be 
able to adequately learn through formal instruction and perform successfully in a 
classroom environment (Carlton & Winsler, 1999; Denham, 2006). Among 
kindergartners in particular, research has shown that children who are high in social 
competence have positive attitudes about adjusting to school, and that they receive 
higher grades than their low-social-competence counterparts (Birch & Ladd, 1997; 
Ladd, Birch, & Buhs, 1999). Furthermore, social-emotional indicators such as 
positive interactions with teachers, emotion regulatory abilities, social skills, and non-
rejected peer status uniquely predict academic success, even when earlier academic 
success is controlled for (Buhs & Ladd, 2001; Izard et al., 2001; Pianta, Steinberg, & 
Rollins, 2009). In contrast, kindergartners who are victimized by peers or are 
aggressive have less school adjustment and are at risk for a potential cascade of 
problems, including school difficulties, delinquency, and drug abuse (Gagnon, Craig, 
Tremblay, Zhou, & Vitaro, 1995; Kochenderfer & Ladd, 1996).  
Identifying and utilizing factors that predict successful developmental paths in 
the social arena play an important role in preventing these negative outcomes and 
maladaptation. Emotion understanding (EU)—the ability to identify, represent, 
describe and predict another person’s emotions—is considered a prerequisite to social 
competence and a component of social cognition (Ornaghi, Brockmeier, & Grazzani, 
2014).  How different types of EU relate to social competence, however, has not been 
well studied. Another recognized component of social cognition is theory of mind 




socio-cognitive components are expected to predict social competence in young 
children as well as to relate to each other (Wang, Liu, & Su, 2014). 
Emotion Understanding and Theory of Mind 
EU has been conceptualized as belonging to two categories: situationistic-type 
and mentalistic-type (Rieffe, Terwogt, & Cowan, 2005). In situationistic EU tasks, 
emotions are caused by an external event or inferred from basic knowledge of 
emotions. Situationistic EU tasks ask the child to predict a character’s emotions based 
on an event that transpired during a story. For example, “Jimmy’s parents take him to 
get ice cream. Jimmy drops his ice cream cone. How does Jimmy feel?” These EU 
tasks do not require the child to use a character’s specific mental state to answer how 
the character is feeling. Rather, the child may use social scripts, how they themselves 
would feel in that situation, or personal schemas (conceptual frameworks derived 
from past experiences that shape interpretation of present experiences) to predict the 
character’s emotions. Another example of situationistic EU is when children are 
asked to identify a person’s emotion based on their facial expression alone.  This 
requires knowledge of what facial expression is linked to a specific emotion, but does 
not require the child to interpret the internal causes of the emotion.  In contrast, 
mentalistic-type EU requires emotions to be linked to internal causes—such as the 
character’s thoughts, desires, or beliefs (ex. “Jimmy and Martha are siblings. Jimmy 
likes ice cream and Martha does not. Jimmy and Martha’s parents bring back ice 
cream for dessert. How does Jimmy feel? How does Martha feel?”). Research 




there are different desires/beliefs between two characters in a story or even between a 
character in a story and themselves (Rieffe et al., 2005). 
Developmental data from Pons and colleagues (2004) suggest that situation-
type EU develops first and is necessary and possibly sufficient for continuing on to 
mentalistic type EU. Yet, how mentalistic versus situationistic EU relate to social 
competence and other external correlates is less understood. Theoretically, 
situationistic and mentalistic tasks require different demands and involve distinct 
social aspects: situation-type EU should require accessing social knowledge (i.e., 
accurate knowledge of social information such as pairing an emotion with a facial 
expression or a common situation). Mentalistic EU, although it involves some social 
knowledge, also requires mental understanding processes and socio-cognitive skills 
(attributing someone’s emotions to the interplay between the external event and that 
person’s thoughts, desires, or beliefs). Notably, both situationistic EU and mentalistic 
EU are components of socio-perception (i.e., perceiving and interpreting social scenes 
to infer why a peer might be angry). It is what drives these perceptions (knowledge 
vs. cognitive-emotional processing) that suggest these two types of emotion 
understanding are distinct (Wang et al., 2014). 
In support of this distinction, some research has shown that situationistic EU 
and mentalistic EU do not relate to each other, and that they relate differentially to 
external correlates such as ToM (Weimer, Sallquist, & Bolnick, 2012). Weimer and 
colleagues (2012) implemented several EU tasks using the vignette-style paradigm 
(adapted from the Test of Emotion Comprehension; Pons, Harris, & Rosnay, 2004), 




expression, event, or reminder of an event (which are examples of situationistic EU 
tasks) or given the belief, desires or hidden emotions of the character (examples of 
mentalistic EU tasks). Results indicated that EU tasks that were situationistic did not 
relate to EU tasks that were mentalistic among 4.5- to 6-year-old participants. This 
provides preliminary evidence that situationistic and mentalistic EU are distinct 
constructs that may relate differently to external correlates. More specifically, the 
Weimer and colleagues (2012) study found that the external cause EU task (which is 
considered a situationistic-type EU task) related to ToM, as measured by false-belief 
tasks, while other, more mentalistic type EU tasks did not relate to ToM.   
From a theoretical standpoint, this last finding is surprising. ToM abilities of 
representing others’ mental states (such as desires and beliefs) should feed into one’s 
mentalistic EU ability to predict emotions based on these mental states (Rieffe et al., 
2005), more so than their situationistic EU ability (Cassidy, Werner, Rourke, 
Zubernis, & Balaraman, 2003).  While Weimer and colleagues’ (2012) study found 
the opposite of this theoretical standpoint, it is difficult to ascertain if this pattern of 
correlation is an actual phenomenon or an artifact of the EU “vignette-paradigm,” 
which provides children all the cues, context, and interpretation needed to provide the 
“right” answer and may not reflect more nuanced real-world EU demands.  We 
discuss the issue of the vignette paradigm and alternative forms of EU measurement 
in chapter 2. 
In order to enhance the construct clarity of EU, this study compared a novel 
mentalistic storytelling EU task that aligned well with the theoretical demands of 




demands, while investigating their differential relationships to several external 
correlates such as ToM and social competence. In the broadest sense, this study 
sought to identify differences between mentalistic and situationistic EU by 
investigating whether the expected relationship to social competence persists with 
both mentalistic- and situationistic-type tasks, and by investigating how mentalistic-
type EU (as measured by a storytelling task) relates to ToM. 
The Target Age Group 
Research suggests the capacity for mentalistic emotion understanding 
develops at around 5 years of age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Wang, Liu and 
Su (2014), in a longitudinal study on the developmental trajectory of preschoolers’ 
emotion understanding (happiness, sadness, anger, and fear) and false-belief 
understanding (a type of ToM task discussed further in chapter 2) measured 3- and 4-
year-olds’ performance, four times, at approximately half-yearly intervals (2014). 
Results showed that children’s ability to understand emotions via a situationistic task 
and ability to represent mental states via false-belief tasks increased significantly at 
each time point in the first year and a half, but no significant increases were found in 
the last 6 months (above 6 years of age) (Wang et al., 2014). In order to measure EU 
and ToM performance in a population with a variation of ability and because onset of 
these abilities are expected during this time frame, 5 to 6 year olds were the target age 





In this study, the theorized developmental precursors of social competence, 
situationistic EU, mentalistic EU, and ToM were examined. This study investigated 
how these constructs relate to each other, to overall social competence, and to 
subcategories of social competence in kindergartners, when vocabulary is controlled. 
The research questions were as follows: 
1) Are situationistic EU and mentalistic EU distinct constructs? How 
do they relate to each other and to external correlates, such as ToM 
and subcomponents of social competence? 
2) When taken together, do situationistic EU, mentalistic EU, and 
ToM predict a significant amount of variation in teacher ratings of 
social competence when controlling for vocabulary? 
3) Will mentalistic EU remain a significant predictor of teacher-rated 
social competence in a model that includes, situationistic EU and 




Chapter 2: Overview of the Literature 
Background 
Social Competence. Social competence is a broad construct with a long 
history of research in the developmental psychology field. Broad definitions of social 
competence include adaptive behaviors, social skills, and peer acceptance, and 
require a range of measurement options: from observation of social behaviors, to 
peer-likeability ratings, to comprehensive behavioral scales completed by the child, 
parent, or teacher. The definition of social competence used for this study involved 
how specific elements of social competence related to social skills. In this study, 
social competence is defined as children’s pro-social behavior, peer relationship 
interactions, quality of social skills (i.e., communication, assertion, responsibility, 
self-control, empathy, engagement, etc.), and frequency of problem behaviors 
(externalizing and internalizing) (Gresham, Elliott, Vance, & Cook, 2011). 
The socio-perceptual skills of EU (understanding and recognizing another 
person’s emotions) and socio-cognitive skills of ToM  (ability to understand and 
represent another person’s belief state) are thought to be prerequisites or components 
of the social competence construct, as they relate to the overall social efficacy of the 
child (Ornaghi et al., 2014).  Krebs and Sturrup (1982) found that preschoolers’ 
performance on cognitive role-taking tasks was significantly correlated with altruistic 
behavior in the classroom and with teachers’ ratings of prosocial behavior and 
cooperativeness. Similarly, Iannotti (1985) found that preschoolers’ emotional role-




These studies highlight the potential impact that mental state understanding and 
emotion understanding can have on acquiring social competence skills.  
Emotion Understanding.  Simple forms of emotion understanding can be 
found in infants as young as 3 months old, with reports of infant distress when a 
caregiver is impassive or has a non-responsive facial expression, which suggest that 
infants can recognize others’ emotions (Ekman & Oster, 1979). More formal 
components of emotion understanding are thought to develop between 3–4 years of 
age. They involve the skills of emotion identification, or labeling emotions based on 
facial expressions, in both schematic drawings and photographs. Other rudimentary 
EU skills involve situation knowledge, or predicting emotions of agents based on the 
external events of a story (Pons, Harris, & Rosnay, 2004). While these “situationistic” 
skills of emotion identification and situation knowledge form a vital foundation 
towards successful emotion understanding across development, they are also 
“simplistic” in that they do not necessarily require a child to understand or represent 
mental states in order to arrive at a label or prediction of emotion. Rieffe, Terwogt, 
and Cowan (2005) discussed how children’s emotion understanding goes beyond the 
ability to represent emotions as the “mechanical product of the situation” but also 
entails “understanding that emotions can be a consequence of the interpretation of a 
situation as well” (p. 1). Understanding and then using a subjective representation of 
situations to predict others’ emotions involves a) representing mental states, such as 
beliefs and desires (ToM) and b) interpretation, or using those perceived mental states 




Advanced emotion understanding. These more “mentalistic” forms of 
emotion understanding among young children were of interest to this study—
predicting emotions based on a person’s perceived mental state from a perceived 
social context. ToM literature places the understanding of others’ mental states, 
specifically the ability to understand that desires and beliefs are subjective, at around 
five years of age (Rieffe, Terwogt, Koops, Stegge, & Oomen, 2001). Yet, whether or 
not children are apt to use this understanding of mental states to predict emotions, 
under what circumstances, and at what age they do so, is still under investigation. A 
study involving 3–5 year olds found that around age five, children use the fact that 
people have different desires and beliefs to predict others’ emotions accordingly, even 
if they find those desires undesirable (Rieffe et al., 2001). Another study by Rieffe 
and colleagues (2005) looked at the circumstances under which mental states were 
used to predict emotions. The experiment involved 4-, 6-, and 10-year-olds whom 
were told stories and asked to explain typical (expected) and atypical (unexpected) 
emotional reactions depicted by the characters in the story. Because atypical 
emotional reactions are unexpected, it was hypothesized that children would be more 
likely to refer to mental states, such as desires and beliefs, in explaining atypical 
emotional reactions, than when explaining typical emotions. Findings confirmed that 
both age and type of emotional reaction affected use of mental states to explain 
emotions. However there was an interaction effect involving the type of emotion, 
with anger, happiness, and sadness mainly evoking references to desire as an 
explanation, and fear evoking more references to belief, even in four-year-olds. This 




states to explain emotions (especially if they are atypical) although younger children 
are overall more likely to explain an emotion based on an external cause/situation 
than based on a character’s mental state (Rieffe et al., 2005).  Pons and colleagues 
(2004) investigated the developmental periods and hierarchical organization of 
several components of emotion understanding across 3 to 11 year olds. Based on a 
sample of 100 children (20 in each age group), the percentage of children succeeding 
by component and age was calculated. For the emotion understanding components of  
“desire” (understanding that two people have different emotions about the same 
situations because of their different desires) and “belief” (understanding that a 
person’s beliefs, whether false or true, will determine their emotional reaction to the 
situation), five-year-olds succeeded at a rate of 55% and 40% respectively while 
seven year olds succeed at a rate of 75% and 85% respectively (Pons et al., 2004). 
This shows five-year-olds’ propensity to use desires (over beliefs) to explain 
emotions and that around half of five-year-olds are able to successfully answer 
emotion understanding tasks involving mental states. Notably, for the EU tasks 
described by Pons et al. (2004), the character’s internal state (their desires/beliefs) are 
explicitly stated (given) in the story. These tasks may differ from real-world emotion 
understanding, where a child must notice cues and context by themselves and guess 
the internal state of the person (emotions and thoughts) from cues in the environment.  
Theory of mind.  ToM, or the ability to make inferences about another 
person’s mental state, is considered an important element for functioning successfully 
in the social world (Weimer & Guajardo, 2005). Because both EU and ToM involve 




found to increase ToM level as well (Ornaghi et al., 2014). Measurements of ToM 
often involve false-belief (FB) tasks; a child must represent two states of reality and 
make a prediction of a character’s behavior based on that character’s belief state. An 
example of a false-belief task is the Unexpected Contents task, where a child is shown 
a box marked by some descriptor (such as a Band-Aid box) and is asked what she 
thinks is inside the box (Band-Aids). The experimenter then opens the box and 
reveals an unexpected object (such as rubber bands) instead. The rubber bands are 
returned to the box and then the child is asked what her friend, who has never looked 
inside the box, will think is in the box (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). What most FB 
tasks attempt to tap into in the ToM development progression is the acquisition of 
“meta-representational reasoning” which usually develops between 4–5 years of age, 
and involves the ability to contrast the reality of an object or event with how the 
object appears to be or how it appears to another person (Lucariello, Durand, & 
Yarnell, 2007).   
Overall, ToM research often extends beyond these “first order” false belief 
tasks into higher-order tasks (an inference about a belief about a belief) and can 
become further complicated by introducing emotions as caused by false beliefs 
(Liddle & Nettle, 2006). The administration and form of ToM tasks are similar to EU 
tasks in that they usually involve a vignette, with pictures or props. Similar to EU 
tasks, false belief tasks are also ability-focused, structured performance measures.  
However, instead of asking the child what the character feels at the end of the story, 




Notably, while false belief tasks are a common measure of ToM (almost all 
the studies reviewed below utilize a false belief task to represent ToM) some 
researchers suggest that the false belief tasks are overused in the ToM literature and 
only delineate one aspect of the vast ToM construct. Additionally, false belief tasks 
often entails more than mental state understanding. As Bloom and German (2000) 
discuss,  
Even if children understand that beliefs can be false…to solve it, the child has 
to follow the actions of two characters in a narrative, has to appreciate that 
Sally could not have observed the switching of the chocolate, has to remember 
both where the chocolate used to be and where it is at the time of the test, and 
has to appreciate the precise meaning of the question (for instance, that it 
means where will Sally look, not where she should look. (p. B27) 
Furthermore, there are other tasks that can reveal understanding of the minds 
of others (e.g., vignettes that ask you to explain a characters actions given the context 
clues). Therefore, this study utilized the NEPSY-II ToM subtest, which not only 
includes several false belief tasks, but also broader ToM-related items that also tap 
into children’s mental understanding of others.  
Social Competence and Emotion Understanding 
Several studies have shown a relationship between rudimentary emotion 
understanding and positive peer relationships (a component of social competence) 
(e.g., Custrini & Feldman, 1989; Waiden & Field, 1990). For example, emotion 
identification abilities (identifying emotion expressions) have been shown to relate to 




2000). Additionally, Izard and colleagues (2001) found that emotion identification 
abilities at age 5 were positively correlated with cooperation and negatively 
correlated with hyperactivity and internalizing behaviors at age 9. In another study, 
Weimer and colleagues (2005) asked 3–5 year olds to describe what makes them, a 
friend, and their parents, happy, sad, angry, and scared, to determine if the quality of 
the child’s response to the open-ended question related to parent and teacher 
measures of social skills. Results showed that neither teachers’ nor parents’ overall 
ratings of children’s social skills significantly correlated with the composite emotion 
understanding scores. However, the quality of response to the open-ended EU task 
related significantly to certain social competence subscales. For example, how well 3- 
to 5-year-olds described what makes them or a friend, happy, sad, angry, and scared 
related to teacher ratings of the social skills on the expressivity subscale (which 
measures sympathy, confidence, understanding of feelings, and an enjoyment of 
talking) when controlling for age and language. This finding suggests that, at least for 
children between ages 3 and 5, there are some distinct components of EU that relate 
to distinct components of social skills, and that an open-ended EU task (such as the 
storytelling task that is used in this study) can relate to teacher-rated social skills. 
Despite evidence for the relationship between situationistic EU and social 
competence components, there is less research on how mentalistic EU relates to 
social competence. The Weimer and colleagues (2005) study discussed above, can be 
thought of as both situationistic and mentalistic—because the question “What makes 
your (subject) happy?” allows the participant to use either an external cause or 




young age group (3–5 year olds) in this study, Weimer and colleagues (2005) 
reported mostly “situationistic-type” answers from the participants (e.g., “I am happy 
when it is my birthday”) that were related to an external event. A similar task given to 
an older age group, who are theoretically able to construct stories with desire and 
beliefs as well as with external causes, may produce different results.  
In summary, EU, specifically situationistic EU, relates to peer relationships 
among 3 to 5 year olds, specifically when measured by teacher raters. Teacher reports 
of children’s expressiveness (assessments of the likelihood that the child displayed 
such behaviors as sympathy, confidence, understanding of feelings, and an enjoyment 
of talking) related to EU as measured by children’s abilities to identify causes of their 
own and a friend’s emotions. Similarly, in a study by Cassidy, Werner, Rourke, 
Zubernis, and Balaraman (2003)  on children ranging from 3–5.5 years, those with 
higher EU scores were more likely to be observed receiving praise, comfort, help, 
sharing, or an apology from a peer.  
 While situationistic EU seems to correspond with the facets of social 
competence that involve positive peer interactions, the relation between mentalistic 
EU and social competence is less studied. There is evidence that children as young as 
4 are able to use mental states of desire and belief as causes of emotion. How this 
ability relates to or predicts components of social competence, however, is less 
understood (Weimer & Guarjardo, 2005).  One goal of the current study was to 
clarify how mentalistic EU related to components of social competence in 
kindergarten-age children.  The expansive literature on ToM provides clues about 




supports a expectation that the relationship between mentalistic EU and social 
competence will somewhat mirror the relationship between ToM and social 
competence.  The review below highlights implications of the current literature on 
how understanding of mental states relates to more nuanced facets of social 
competence.  
Social Competence and Theory of Mind 
Liddle and Nettle (2006) reported a positive correlation between teacher-rated 
child social competence and first- and second-order ToM performance among 10- and 
11-year-old children. Lalonde and Chandler (1995) found that individual differences 
in FB tasks correlated with teacher ratings of socioemotional maturity, specifically for 
intentional positive social behaviors (such as playing cooperatively or engaging in 
make-believe play). However, there was no correlation between these false-belief 
tasks and conventional positive behaviors (e.g. saying ‘please’ and ‘thank you’ and 
taking turns) (Lalonde & Chandler, 1995). These results suggest that conventional 
positive behaviors that rely on social scripts or parental instruction may not involve 
representing mental states. Therefore, ToM may not be a useful predictor for social 
outcomes that rely on knowledge of social scripts (conventional social competence) 
but may be a good predictor of interpreting social scenes correctly. Additionally, 
Cassidy and colleagues (2003) found that children with higher ToM scores were 
considered more popular by their peers. Meanwhile, having a higher situationistic EU 
was not related to peer popularity. Social skill items that warrant more nuanced social 
interactions (successful playtime, peer popularity) may therefore relate better to ToM 




social competence items that involve more conventional social skills—like being 
polite, taking turns and following structured, specific rules—may relate more to 
situationistic EU, be more readily observable to teachers, and involve positive peer 
interactions. 
As discussed above, the subcategories and types of social competence are 
important details to consider when determining the relationship between ToM and 
social competence. Another important consideration is potential confounding 
variables, such as language development, that have been shown to correlate highly 
with EU and Social Competence.  One weakness of many early ToM and social 
competence studies is that they ignored the role of language in ToM success (Cassidy 
et al., 2003).  A meta-analysis on the effects of language on false belief understanding 
indicates a moderate-to-large effect size of language on false belief understanding 
remains significant when controlling for age (Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). 
Cassidy and colleagues’ (2003) study shows an example of this language effect: 
preschoolers’ ToM, emotion understanding, and prosocial behavior across multiple 
raters (observers, teachers and peers) were investigated.  The ToM score was 
determined by combining FB change-of-location and unexpected-contents task 
scores. Social competence was measured via the Social Skills Rating System (SSRS) 
completed by teachers, and by a global rating scale of children’s social skills, 
completed by research observers. Classmates also provided peer-likeability scores by 
rating their peers in the classroom.  Their results indicated that when language was 
controlled for, teachers’ and observers’ ratings of children’s social skills were not 




year-olds, children’s ToM (according to FB tasks) continued to predict peer ratings of 
likeability, suggesting that children preferred peers with higher ToM scores to peers 
with less ToM understanding.   
In contrast to the findings that global social skills were not related to ToM as 
rated by teachers and observers (Cassidy et al., 2003), Watson and colleagues 
(Watson, Nixon, Wilson, & Capage, 1999) found 3- to 6-year-olds’ false-belief 
understanding to be related to teachers’ assessment of children’s overall social 
competence with peers, even after controlling for the effects of age, language 
comprehension ability and talkativeness.  These dissonant findings could be due to 
the older age group involved in Watson’s study, which included 5- to 6-years-olds, 
compared to Cassidy and colleagues’ study, which that involved young children no 
older than 5 years. This may point to older children’s social competence being more 
salient to teachers and younger children’s competence being evident only for peer 
ratings (Cassidy et al., 2003). Mixed findings could also stem from the type of social 
competence measure used. While both the Watson et al. (1999) and Cassidy et al. 
(2003) studies used measures that asked about peer relations—a feature connected 
with ToM—they asked in different ways. Watson and colleagues (1999) used a 7-
item measure that asked teachers to compare and contrast general social skills of the 
child with other children their age (e.g., “Compared to other children this child's age, 
this child has very good social skills” vs. “Compared to other children this child's age, 
this child does not have very good social skills”). After choosing between the 
contrasts, the teachers were then asked to indicate if the statements were “sort of” or 




to relate to ToM, and which require the rater (in this case the actual child) to compare 
another child to their peers. In contrast, Cassidy and colleagues used the SSRS, which 
asks teachers to rate the frequency (never, sometimes, often) of the child’s socially 
competent and adaptive behaviors (e.g. “Makes friends easily, helps you without 
being asked, accepts peers’ ideas for group activities, and invites others to join in 
activities.”) While this approach may feature items involving quality peer relations, it 
does not force the rater to actively compare the child in question to their peers. 
Reporting the frequency of the social behavior does not equate to a report on its level 
of quality. 
Despite inconsistencies associated with the SSRS, the Social Skills 
Improvement System or SSIS (a revised version of the SSRS) was used in the study 
for two reasons. First, there are an abundance of social competence measures in the 
current literature that use frequency (never, sometimes, always) to rate dimensions of 
social competence, and some of these types of measures have been shown to yield 
relations to ToM (Weimer and Guarjardo, 2005). Furthermore, practical consideration 
made it difficult to include peer measures that asked teachers to compare children to 
peers (e.g., some schools are uncomfortable with comparing students to one another). 
Additionally, the SSIS provides parallel forms for parents and teachers, who are 
important informants of social skills for this age group and can provide different 
perspectives and information on students’ behavioral strengths and weaknesses. Still, 
not having another form of social competence measure is a weakness of this study. 
We discuss other explanations for the dissonant findings of the relationship between 




To further explain mixed findings in the social competence literature, some 
researchers have investigated whether the type of FB task matters when relating ToM 
to social competence; that is, whether different FB tasks relate differentially with 
children’s social skills. Weimer and Guajardo (2005) found that in an array of FB 
tasks  (viz., Unexpected Change, Deception, Unexpected Contents, and Active 
Deception), only preschoolers’ (3 to 5 years old) performance on the Unexpected 
Contents correlated with teachers’ ratings of children’s social skills, even when 
language ability was controlled—positively correlating with compliant behavior and 
negatively correlating with ratings of disruptive behavior.  There were no significant 
correlations between ToM tasks and parent ratings of social competence, with and 
without language controlled. Social competence was measured by frequency of social 
behaviors (never, sometimes, often) as perceived by teachers (e.g. “helpful” or 
“shares”). This measure did not ask raters to compare the child to peers nor did the 
measure differentiate between conventional and intentional social competence items. 
In summary, when analyzing the relationship between ToM and social 
competence, it is important to control for vocabulary/language, as correlations to 
more global indicators of social competence tend to disappear, leaving significant 
correlations to only a select few social indicators, such as peer likeability, for children 
under 5 years of age (Cassidy et al., 2003). In contrast, for older children (ages 5–6,) 
when age and language are controlled, ToM tasks are still related to global social 
competence and social skills (Watson et al., 1999). These findings may point to older 
children’s social competence being more salient to teachers and younger children’s 




artifact of the social competence measure used. Global social competence items that 
are worded as a comparison to peers and targeted at general interpersonal 
effectiveness and quality of behavior may show a relation to ToM.  Other measures 
(such as the SSIS) that ask for frequency of social behaviors and social skills (as a 
manifestation of broader social competence), may not relate to ToM. However this 
conjecture still needs to be tested. Similarly, items worded as conventional vs. 
intentional social competence may relate differently to ToM (Annotti and Teglasi, in 
press). Overall, there is evidence that not all ToM tasks are created equal in relation 
to social competence—as 3–5 year old children who do well on the unexpected-
contents task specifically seem more likely to be compliant and less likely to be 
disruptive, compared to children who succeed in other FB tasks (Weimer & Guajardo, 
2005).  This study includes ToM, as measured by several false belief tasks (“ToM 
False Belief”) and ToM as measured by other tasks (ToM Non-False Belief), such as 
the ability to abstract a mental state based on a picture or saying (e.g., identifying that 
a man is thinking based on a picture or interpreting a persons’ statement in a non-
literal way based on the context), imitation (using joint attention and imitation to play 
a copy game together), and understanding that characters in a story have very 
different perspectives and being able to explain characters’ actions based on these 
differing perspectives. Also included is a composite ToM measure (ToM Verbal) that 
combined items from both ToM False Belief and ToM Non-False Belief tasks of the 
NEPSY II.  
Overall, situationistic EU, ToM and mentalistic EU were expected to show 




tasks and mentalistic EU were expected to positively relate to the social competence 
subscales involving popularity with peers and successful free play (i.e., engagement 
and responsibility subscales), higher rates of compliance (i.e., responsibility and 
externalizing problem subscales), and subscales related to noticing social nuances 
(i.e., empathy).  Situationistic EU was expected to relate to subscales involving 
positive peer interactions of the conventional social competence nature—such as 
scripted interactions (i.e., communication subscales), rule following (i.e., cooperation 
subscale) and to negatively correlate to internalizing behavior.   
Emotion Understanding and Theory of Mind  
ToM and emotion understanding are theoretically related constructs, as the 
ability to represent other’s mental states (such as desires and beliefs) feeds into one’s 
ability to predict and understand emotions (Ornaghi et al., 2014).  Furthermore, Rieffe 
and colleagues (2005) posit that ToM may be a pre-requisite step for advanced 
emotion understanding, where children predict emotions based on the mental states of 
desires and beliefs that cause them. However, correlational studies that investigate the 
connection between ToM and general EU show mixed results. Some researchers have 
found that among 3–5 year olds, ToM and emotion understanding (measured with 
situationistic EU tasks) appear uncorrelated (Cassidy, Werner, Rourke, Zubernis, & 
Balaraman, 2003;Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Dunn, 1995).  For example, the 
situationistic EU task used by Cassidy and colleagues with 3- to 5-year-olds involved 
the presentation of a series of 8 stories, enacted with a puppet followed by a request 
match the correct emotional response (happy, sad, angry, afraid) given the details of 




experience emotions similar to what the child felt (typical) and instances where the 
puppet would feel differently from what the child felt (atypical). An example of 
atypical situation would be: “Jamie is going to the doctor to get a shot. Jamie loves to 
get shots because the doctor gives Jamie a lollipop when she is done.” At the end of 
the story, the child is asked how Jamie, the puppet, feels and is asked to place the 
appropriate expression on the puppets face. Results found no significant correlation 
between the EU task and ToM (measured via FB) after controlling for children’s 
vocabulary and socioeconomic status.  
In contrast, others have shown positive relations between general emotion 
understanding and ToM, even with controlling for age and language abilities (Weimer 
et al. 2012; Hughes & Dunn, 1988). Weimer and Guajardo (2005) required 3- to 5-
year-old children to describe what makes a friend happy, sad, angry or afraid and 
found that the quality of response correlated positively with overall FB knowledge (as 
measured via a range of FB tasks), independent of age and vocabulary ability. 
Similarly, Weimer and colleagues (2012) found that the composite EU score 
(assessed using both situationistic and mentalistic EU tasks) related to the composite 
ToM score, among 4.5- to 6.5-year-olds, when controlling for age. 
Several researchers have tried to make sense of these mixed findings by 
positing that the “type” of emotion understanding task matters in investigating 
correlations with ToM.  Weimer and colleagues (2012) expected to find that more 
advanced emotion understanding abilities (such as predicting an emotion the 
protagonist is trying to hide, or predicting the current emotional state of the 




advanced emotion understanding abilities (such as a situation knowledge task) would 
predict children’s FB score in 4.5- to 6.5-year-olds.  In contrast, they found that only 
children’s understanding of external causes (situationistic EU task) predicted FB 
performances. 
Harwood and Farrar (2006) posited that these mixed results of the correlation 
between ToM (represented via FB tasks) and emotion understanding may be due to 
conflating very different types of emotion understanding tasks as similar; namely 
emotion understanding items that reflected a child’s ability to understand conflicting 
emotions (either internally or between two people) and items where there were no 
conflicting emotions present. In support of their theory, they found that when 
children, 3–5 years of age, were presented with vignettes where they and a friend 
either had matching emotional reactions (sad–sad or happy–happy) or different 
emotional reactions (sad–happy or happy–sad), FB tasks were only significantly 
related to vignettes of the “different emotions” type.  The authors postulate that the 
“different emotions” task required children to predict another person’s internal state 
when it differed from his or her own—similar to demands of the FB tasks. These 
findings suggest that the type of emotion understanding task matters; if one expects to 
find a correlation between EU and ToM, each task must have similar demands 
(Harwood and Farrar, 2006).  
In summary, the relationship between ToM and emotion understanding is still 
under investigation. While theoretically, these constructs are related and one may 
even be a prerequisite for the other, research does not provide a robust account for 




demands of the ToM task in order to see a correlation (Harwood & Farrar, 2006). One 
example of an appropriate type of EU task that may be related to ToM, is one that 
involves some form of emotional tension, where the child must represent different 
emotions or desires for different characters in a story. (See Narrative Measurements 
of Emotion Understanding section for how the mentalistic measure used in this study 
uses tensions and conflicts of desires in the stimuli). Weimer, Sallquist and Bolnick 
(2012) showed that situationistic tasks related to false-belief tasks whereas 
mentalistic-type tasks did not, this finding is surprising and should be further 
investigated. Another possible reason for these mixed results is the age group of 
study—several studies that found no correlation between ToM and Emotion 
Understanding, used primarily 3–5 years olds. An older population may be more 
adept at tapping into their mental understanding abilities than younger populations 
(Cassidy et al., 2003).  
Issues in Measurement 
Traditional measurements of emotion understanding and theory of mind.  
Several measures have been developed to assess the construct of EU. Most measures 
employ a vignette paradigm, where the proctor reads a short story and asks if the 
character feels happy, sad, mad, scared or has no feeling. The scenarios are highly 
prototypical and familiar to the child (going to get ice cream, playing a game, eating 
food). Traditionally, situationistic EU tasks and mentalistic EU tasks have a similar 
form and administration despite the varying levels of complexity and task demands.  
These similarities include a) a structured performance task, where there is a correct 




participants to the correct answer; b) 2–3 sentence vignette stories presented to the 
child featuring one or several characters; information about an external event, internal 
desire or belief or thought is given in the story; c) a multiple choice prompt of 
whether the character/characters in the story feels happy, sad, mad, scared or no 
feeling; d) associated props or picture books to illustrate the stories; e) scoring of 
children’s answers as either right or wrong, with some scoring including partial credit 
for the correct valence; f) gender-specific or gender-ambiguous stories; and g) 
correcting pre-requisite information such as a false-belief state or past feeling that 
was answered incorrectly, before asking the main emotion question of how the 
character is feeling. (For a general overview of different EU tasks, descriptions and 
age of onset, see Appendix A).  
Situationistic EU measurement.  Situationistic EU can be measured by 
considering emotion recognition and external cause, respectively. 
Emotion recognition. Emotion recognition is a component of emotion 
understanding that involves an ability to recognize and label emotion in facial 
expressions and social situations (Izard, Schultz, & Fine, 2000). Onset of this skill 
occurs at approximately 3-4 years of age (meaning children less than 3 years old are 
unlikely to show mastery of this skill). Several studies have found a connection 
between emotion recognition and aspects of social behavior, such as peer 





External cause. Emotion situation knowledge involves the ability to match 
emotion labels with events (Schultz, Izard, Ackerman, & Youngstrom, 2001). 
Literature in this paradigm is usually based on Denham’s (1986) work, which 
assesses a child’s acknowledgement of feelings experienced by an agent in a certain 
situation. For example, children are shown a puppet, presented with several stories 
about the puppet and are given a score based on whether the child’s identification of 
an emotion matches the events of the story (ex. a child anticipates sadness of a 
character in a vignette who has lost their favorite toy) (Cassidy et al., 2003; Garner & 
Estep, 2001).  Being able to understand how external causes affect the emotions of 
others is shown to have an onset age of 3–4 years old.  
Mentalistic EU measurement.  Measures of mentalistic EU involve methods 
of measuring emotions as related to the understanding of desire and belief states. 
Desire. With onset between 3–5 years, children are able to predict a persons’ 
emotional reactions depending on the character’s desire. This task can involve a 
single character being disappointed in a situation where his or her desire was not met 
or may involve two people feeling a different emotion due to a difference of desires 
(Pons, Lawson, Harris, & Rosnay, 2003). 
Belief. Onset is between 4-6 years of age. Children understand that they can 
use a person’s beliefs (whether false or true) to predict the emotional reaction in a 
given situation. Usually, the person’s mental state/beliefs are provided to the child 




Theory of mind measurement.  ToM is typically approached through false-
belief tasks with common tasks include the unexpected change of locations tasks and 
unexpected contents tasks.  However, as previously discussed, these measures should 
not be considered the end-all for ToM measurement—any measure that taps into 
understanding other’s mental states can be thought of as ToM, with false-belief tasks 
being one-of-many ToM options (Bloom & German, 2000). Recent updates of a 
popular neuropsychology assessment, the Developmental NEuroPSYchological 
Assessment, 2nd edition (NEPSY-II; Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 2007) included both 
false belief task and non-false belief tasks, with the latter tapping into advanced ToM.  
Specific ToM tasks, as pertinent to the study are discussed below.  
Unexpected change of location.  False-belief (FB) tasks are the most common 
ToM tasks found in the literature. They involve acknowledgment of a state of reality 
that differs from one’s own (or another agent’s) belief state and often ask for 
predictions of behavior based on that belief state. This classic FB task was created by 
Wimmer and Perner (1983) and involves a story where an object is placed in one 
location by the agent and then consequently moved to another location by another 
character in the story while the agent is unaware. After listening to the story, the child 
is asked where the agent will look for the object, in location 1 (where the agent left it 
last) or location 2 (where the secondary character moved the object to). Modifications 
to this task involved acting out the change of location using a puppet that places a 
favorite toy in box 1 for safekeeping, and while the puppet is away the experimenter 





Unexpected contents or deceptive contents.  Usually adapted from Perner, 
Leekam, and Wimmer (1987) or (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), in an unexpected 
contents task, the child is shown a box marked by some descriptor (such as a Band-
Aid box) and is asked what she thinks is inside the box (Band-Aids). The 
experimenter then opens the box and reveals an unexpected object (such as rubber 
bands) instead. The rubber bands are returned to the box and then the child is asked 
what her friend, who has never looked inside the box, will think is in the box.   
Non-False belief ToM tasks. Non-false belief tasks can be verbal, pictorial, or 
both and involve asking questions about the given scenario or pictures, whose 
answers reveal an understanding of the mental states or the characters’ point of view. 
Baron-Cohen (1989) developed several first-order theory of mind tasks that are still 
used in major measures of children’s cognitive functioning (e.g., NEPSY-II). In 
appearance-reality task, participants are tasked with using their own mental states to 
judge their environment by distinguishing between appearance and reality. One 
example of this task, from the NEPSY-II ToM subtest, is a pictured teakettle that 
looks like an apple. Children are then asked what the object is (a correct answer being 
a tea-kettle).  Another ToM task is the mental-physical distinction, where the 
participant must differentiate between different mental states (i.e., thoughts, dreams, 
pretense and memories) and their connection to a physical phenomena.  On the 
NEPSY-II ToM subtest, an adaptation of this task entails that the child is read a story 
about three different girls who are dreaming about, reading about, or live near, 
dolphins.  Then child is then asked “who can hug the dolphin in real life?” Another 




mental function instead of a behavior function. Another task type on the NEPSY-II 
ToM, the child views a picture of a man that looks like he is thinking and is asked 
“what is the man doing?”. If the child answers with a behavior, such as “putting his 
hand on his chin” or “staring” they would not receive full credit. But if they recognize 
the man is thinking, they have identified a mental state from a pictured stimulus. 
Other ToM tasks involve tasks of abstraction, where the child must go beyond the 
literal (such as literal statement or pictured behavior) and apply contextual clues to 
decipher the person’s meaning or thoughts.  
Limitations. For the emotion understanding measures described above, most 
are structured measures with a clearly defined correct answer that are designed to 
measure the potential ability within the child to reach stages of EU. In contrast to 
these structured measures are unstructured measures, which tap into every day 
demonstrations of the internal ability and real-world performance.  The demands of 
the maximal-type tasks (which aim to measure maximal ability) may not transfer to 
real-world demands in predicting other’s emotions—especially when predicting the 
emotions involves inferring a person’s mental state. Indeed, traditional measures of 
EU involve prototypical situations, where the external events and mental states (like 
the characters thoughts or states) are given (read aloud to the child). In real life, social 
situations may be much more ambiguous, with an incomplete “story” known to the 
child; a child may not be “given” details of a situation before being told to predict a 
person’s emotions, but instead, must notice social cues, context and the environment 
in real time and construct their own story of what is happening in order to predict an 




real world may involve children’s interpretations of what their classmates are 
thinking or feeling based on cues in the environment.  
Narrative measurements of emotion understanding. Novel measures of EU 
that involve similar task demands to EU utilization in the real world involve 
addressing children’s propensity to notice cues and context and make appropriate 
emotion attributions. Answers given during storytelling tasks, such as the Thematic 
Apperceptions Test (TAT), involves interpreting ambiguous social scenes, reveal 
aspects of a person’s thinking and problem solving in real-life social situations. The 
TAT has been used in research to distinguish emotionally disabled children from non-
emotionally disabled children (McGrew & Teglasi, 1990) and in investigating social 
information processing and teacher ratings of aggression (Simcox, 2009).  
Traditionally a projective measures, in this study, the TAT is used as a performance 
measure that calls for the narrator to relate the behaviors they describe with inner 
states that they attribute to story characters.  In this storytelling task, children are 
shown a series of black-and-white pictures depicting a social scene and must size up 
social cues and reason about the social situation. Oftentimes there is implied tension 
or conflict in the stimuli, where it is clear that two characters have different beliefs, 
desires or thoughts (ex. characters are turned away from each other with neutral or 
ambiguous expressions). The instructions for the TAT ask respondents to construct a 
complete story by sharing (Murray, 1943): What is happening in the picture? What 
happened before? How are people (persons) in the picture feeling? What are they 
thinking? How does everything turn out at the end? These story components are 




information processing involved in social problem solving (Teglasi, 2010). 
Participants’ responses can be coded using a myriad of scales/categories, however the 
categories of “level of abstraction,” and “perceptual integration” were chosen for this 
study given their connection to mentalistic emotion understanding. 
 Level of abstraction involves how well a child can “interpret” the social scene 
beyond what is pictured in the scene. Coding is done across four levels, with the 
lowest level corresponding with a highly  “externally organized” story (where 
emotions and other elements of the story are only elicited and tied to what is seen in 
the picture) and the highest coding level corresponding to an “internally organized” 
story (where elements of the story go beyond what is pictured, and is tied to 
character’s thoughts, desires, and long-term plans).  Perceptual integration, similarly, 
identifies the presence of a character’s inner and outer worlds, but focuses on the 
integration of the two, and the presence of social causality in the story (Annotti & 
Teglasi, in press). Coding is done across five levels. Perceptual integration not only 
requires noticing the emotional and interpersonal cues in the picture (e.g., facial 
expressions, posture, location relative to other characters) and the context of the 
picture (objects, background, clothing), but it also entails producing a reasonable 
conceptual framework of the social scene (e.g., thoughts, desires, expectations, and 
schemas) that integrates these details into a story. For example, the posture and facial 
expression of one character in the card may suggest they feel upset, while the other 
character, which has a softer facial expression or a different posture, may not feel the 




these two characters and integrate the context details in order to provide a realistic 
reason and outcome for the conflict.  
Summary of Purpose 
This study aimed to investigate the use of situationistic EU, mentalistic EU 
and ToM in children 5–6 years of age, in relation to social competence and to each 
other. The focus was on how all these components predict social competence when 
taken together and considered in isolation, when controlling for vocabulary. This 
study was novel in its investigation of the relationship between EU and social 
competence, in that it specifically distinguished between mentalistic EU and 
situationistic EU and looked at their differential relationship to social competence. 
Furthermore, this study sought to clarify EU theory by distinguishing between 
mentalistic EU and situationistic EU as separate constructs in relation to ToM.  This 
study sought to avoid common pitfalls of other studies that have compared mentalistic 
EU with ToM, by using a novel mentalistic EU task that required similar task 
demands to ToM false beliefs—showcasing characters that are in conflict and have 
different desires, thoughts and feelings from one another. To the extent that both EU 
and ToM tasks tap into the meta-representation skills of this age group, scores should 
be correlated.  In contrast, a traditional EU measure of situationistic skills that does 
not require mental state understanding was not expected to correlate with ToM. To 
this researcher’s knowledge, few studies have used a narrative task to tap into 
mentalistic EU abilities and relate those to ToM and situationistic EU ability. An 
exception is one study by Symons, Peterson, Slaughter, Roche, and Doyle  (2005) 




“they are thinking,” “they want…”) and ToM performance of 5–7-year-old children 
during a story-telling task. Results indicated the child’s propensity to use cognitive 
and desire state language (but not emotional or behavioral language) correlated 
significantly with a mentalistic EU measure, a change of location ToM measure and a 
combined ToM measure, even when controlling for age, receptive language, and 
socioeconomic status. Furthermore, when children were shown pictures of different 
scenarios, but were just told to tell a story (open question responses) children who 
commented on thoughts, dreams, and feelings of story characters when creating a 
narrative story were more likely than their peers of comparable age and verbal ability 
to pass standard false belief tasks. These findings support the ability of a storytelling 
task to tap into mentalistic-type emotion understanding and to relate to ToM. 
This study used several measures of emotion understanding: 1) The Emotion 
Comprehension Test (ECT; unpublished) a measure of situationistic EU knowledge 
that employed both emotion identification and a vignette paradigm, both popular to 
emotion understanding literature and 2) the TAT, used in this study as a storytelling 
task that measures mentalistic EU by requiring children to size up the tensions 
depicted in pictures, to recognize emotions, and to connect these emotions to both 
external and internal causes. Select items from The Developmental 
NEuroPSYchological test, 2nd edition (NEPSY-II; Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 2007) 
ToM subtest was used as a measure of ToM. Items included several false belief tasks 
as well as broader measures of children’s mental state understanding. This study 




as rated by both parents and teachers. (See Appendix B for a table of constructs and 
their corresponding measures and Appendix C for a description of each measure).  
Hypotheses  
1) Situationistic and mentalistic EU are distinct constructs. 
 1a). There is a low or non-significant correlation between situationistic and 
mentalistic EU. 
1b). Situationistic and mentalistic EU have distinct relations to external 
correlates— mentalistic EU relates to ToM but situationistic EU does not.  
1c). Mentalistic EU and situationistic EU relate differently to various 
subcategories of social competence within the SSIS. Mentalistic EU relates to the 
Engagement, Empathy, Responsibility, and Externalizing subscales on the SSIS, 
whereas situationistic EU relates to the Communication, Cooperation and 
Internalizing subscales.    
2) When taken together, mentalistic EU, situationistic EU and ToM  predict a 
significant amount of variation in social competence for teachers, even when 
controlling for vocabulary.   
2a). Mentalistic EU, situationistic EU and ToM account for a significant 
amount of variance in teacher-rated social competence when controlling for 
vocabulary. 
3) Mentalistic EU remains a significant predictor of teacher-rated social competence 





Chapter 3: Research Methods and Research Designs 
 
Participants  
This study was part of a larger research project conducted by Dr. Hedy 
Teglasi and a team of graduate students. The current study made use of a subset of 
available data, including performance measures of emotion understanding and ToM 
and parent and teacher ratings of social competence. Only participants who had two 
of the three major independent variable measures (e.g., TAT, ToM, and ECT) and at 
least one rater for the SSIS were included. From the larger study sample (N=109) 71 
participants met this criteria. Power analyses using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, & 
Buchner, 2009) were conducted to determine that a sample size of N = 66 would be 
needed for a regression analyses predicting teacher-rated SSIS scores in order to 
detect an R2 of .15 or an f2 effect size of .18 increase from step 1 to step 2, with at 
least .80 level of confidence given the number of predictors in the study (predictors in 
Step 1= 1, predictors in Step 2 = 3).  
The sample was comprised of 71 kindergarten children between 5 to 7 years 
of age, their parents, and their teachers, recruited from six schools in the DC metro 
area, one school in the Chicago area, and one school in the New York area. All 
schools showed similar levels of diversity. Of the schools participating in the study, 
six were private Christian schools, one was a public school, and one was a laboratory 
school under a public research university. Classroom size ranged from 15-25 students 
with participation rates per classroom ranging from 30-60%.  The sample included 41 




The sample size was moderately diverse but the majority of children were White 
(60.6 % White, 15.5 % Black, 9.9 % Latino, 11.3 % Asian, and 2.8 % Unknown).  
Measures 
SSIS parents and teachers.  Parents and teachers rated children’s social and 
academic competence using the Social Skills Improvement System (SSIS; 
approximate completion time is 10 minutes)—a widely used, normed measure 
appropriate for children aged 3–18 that assesses a range of social elements. The test is 
made up of four distinct scales: social skills (made up of assertion, responsibility, 
self-control, communication, cooperation, empathy, and engagement subscales), 
problem behaviors (made up of externalizing, internalizing, bullying, hyperactivity, 
and autism spectrum subscales), and an academic competence scale (only for the 
teacher version) (Gresham et al., 2011).  The research team hand-scored this measure 
using standardized scoring procedures. Norms based on age were used to produce a 
total social skills score. As reported by Gresham et al., 2011, the internal consistency 
and test-retest reliability for both parent and teacher SSIS scales and subscales are 
reasonably robust.  Specifically, the coefficient alphas for both the teacher-and 
parent-rated social skills and externalizing and internalizing scales are all in the mid- 
to upper-.90s.  The subscales in each category have median reliabilities in the mid- to 
high-.80s on both the parent and teacher forms. All the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients 
for individual subscales are equal to or exceed .70.  Furthermore, the test-retest 
indices for total social skills were .82 for the teacher form and .84 for the parent form 




Theory of mind.  Children were administered the ToM subtest from the 
Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment, 2nd edition (NEPSY-II; Korkman, 
Kirk, & Kemp, 2007) with an approximate testing time of 10 minutes, to assess 
participants’ ability to understand that others have thoughts, ideas, and feelings that 
may be different from one’s own. The ToM subtest is standardized and normed with 
adequate reliability. Internal reliability is above .80 for the ToM subtest for the age 
group of 5–6 years of age. Test-retest reliability for ToM total score in 5–6 years of 
age group is .77 (Brooks, Sherman, & Strauss, 2009).  
The ToM subtest involved two parts—a Contextual part and a Verbal part. In 
the Contextual part, children viewed a pictured scenario (e.g., a girl on a 
rollercoaster) and pointed to several facial expressions to denote what the girl must be 
feeling. This part of the ToM task was excluded from the study due to its similarity to 
the ECT Emotion Situations task.  
The ToM Verbal score was computed by summing the child’s performance 
across 15 items. Notably, while the NEPSY-II ToM subtest provides the ToM Verbal 
score, the researcher further subdivided this subpart into a “ToM False Belief “score 
and “ToM Non-False Belief” score. The researcher calculated the ToM False Belief 
score from the child’s performance on four false belief tasks and the ToM Non-False 
Belief score based on the remaining items that made up the ToM Verbal score. The 
False Belief score was made up of several traditional false belief tasks (viz., an 
unexpected change of location vignette, two unexpected contents tasks, and one 
second order ToM task). The remaining tasks (used for the Non-False Belief score) 




indicate they understood a characters’ mental state. For example, for several items, 
the child had to provide a reason for a character’s actions in a story that required an 
understanding of a difference of perspectives between characters.  For other items, the 
child had to go beyond the literal meaning of a statement to interpret what the person 
must mean given the context of the situation.  The child also participated in imitation 
activities and utilized abstraction skills to interpret what an object was or what a 
person was doing in a concrete picture  
Situationistic EU.  Children were administered the Emotion Comprehension 
Test (ECT), developed by Dr. Hedy Teglasi and her research team (unpublished; 
approximate testing time of 20 minutes) for children in the preschool and 
kindergarten age range. This test is an adaptation of the widely used Assessment of 
Children’s Emotion Skills (ACES; Schultz et al., 2004) a non-standardized, non-
normed performance measure. The test consists of three subparts: a) the Emotion 
Identification subtest, b) the Emotions Situations subtest, and d) the Emotion 
Behaviors subtest. Only the first two subparts (Emotion Identification subtest and the 
Emotions Situations subtest) were used for the purposes of this study and were 
combined to form a 36-item measure of situationistic emotion understanding 
(referred to as “ECT-combined” test). The Emotion Identification subtest (21 items) 
required the participant to say whether a series of pictured children were happy, 
mad, sad, scared or had no feeling. The child was then administered the Emotion 
Situations subtest (15 items), where the participants listened to vignettes acted out by 
puppets that provided situational cues to what the character was feeling. After 




sad, scared or no feeling. (Ex. “Green let Red play with Green’s favorite toy. Red 
plays with the toy and then it breaks. Do you think Green feels happy, sad, mad, 
scared, or no feeling?”). The directions for the vignettes were clear and in a language 
appropriate for a three to six year old (See Appendix C for the ECT Emotions 
Situations test). The ECT utilized a 3-point scoring system that differentiated 
between the correct emotion (ex. mad would receive 3 points), an answer with the 
incorrect emotion but with the correct valence (ex. sad or scared would receive 2 
points) and an incorrect emotion (ex. happy or no feeling would receive 1 point). 
The correct answer for each picture/vignette was determined by a team of 
researchers and pilot tested on a group of adults. For some items, more than one 
answer was thought to be appropriate. In those cases, more than answer could 
receive full credit. If there was one clear primary emotion and a likely secondary 
emotion, only the primary emotion was considered as correct. Previous research had 
shown that internal consistency of the Emotion Identification (EID) test (  .80) 
and the Emotions Situations test  (  = .81) (reported in Gustafson, 2009) were 
acceptable according to the commonly used guideline of a Cronbach’s Alpha of .70 
or higher.  
Mentalistic EU.  Children were administered the TAT (administration time 
approximately 15 minutes). The TAT is a non-standardized, non-normed 
performance measure that gives insight into social scripts, schemas and perception 
utilized by the participant. There were seven black and white cards, each with a 
different social scene. For example, in one card a man angrily looks forward as a 




girl on a farm looks off into the distance with books in her hands, while people work 
on the farm behind her. In another card, a girl holds a baby or doll and looks away 
from an adult that is beside her. Children were asked to “tell a story about what is 
happening in the picture. Tell me what happened before, what the characters are 
thinking and feeling and how it all turns out in the end.”  If a child missed an 
element of the story they were prompted to tell about the element missed (e.g. “And 
what are the characters feeling?).  
Participants’ stories were coded for level of abstraction (level 1 to level 4) and 
perceptual integration (level 1 to level 5) with higher levels indicating more well 
developed and adaptive schemas (as discussed in Chapter 2). Abstraction and 
perceptual integration were chosen as codes for mentalistic EU due to their reliance 
on acknowledging and processing the emotions of the characters in the stories and 
integrating those feelings into a larger framework of different thoughts and actions 
across characters. With training and practice, coders have shown inter-rater 
reliability in each of these coding parameters to be .80 or higher (Blankman, Teglasi, 
& Lawser, 2002). The researcher and an expert in the TAT field coded these stories. 
For each participant, an average score for each category (Abstraction and Perceptual 
Integration) was calculated based on an overall sum score divided by the number of 
cards, for each category. These two averages were then averaged together to 
determine the total TAT mean score.  
Vocabulary.  The Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence, 3rd 
edition (WPPSI-III) vocabulary subtest was administered as a proxy for a language 




difficulty and administration takes around 10 minutes. The child is asked to explain 
the meaning of each word (e.g., “What is a ___?” or “What does ___mean?”) 
(Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 2000). This measure was chosen due to its excellent 
reliability coefficient (25 items;  .89) and because of its wide use and targeted 
assessment of young children’s verbal ability  (designed specifically for ages 2:6 to 
7:3). All measures and their corresponding constructs are provided in Appendix B. 
Procedure 
Procedure for recruitment.  These procedures were part of a larger study 
that spanned from Spring 2012 to the present. IRB approval was obtained to conduct 
a human research study. School administration was contacted to gauge interest in 
schools’ participation. Researchers met in person with teachers and/or parents when 
possible—The research team made presentations to parents and teachers attending a 
Back to School night, explaining the purpose of the study and requirements of parents 
and children who chose to participate. A letter detailing the study, including 
Institutional Review Board information, as well as a consent form, was placed in the 
parent mailbox of children attending the kindergarten class.  
Procedures spanned from the fall to the spring semester of each academic year 
until all participants were tested. Data collection began in late fall to ensure the 
teachers knew students well enough in order to rate their behavior and that students’ 
behaviors were typical. Questionnaires were sent to parents’ home using the parent 
mailbox and hand-delivered to the teachers’ classrooms. Parents completed 
questionnaires and returned them to the classroom teacher in the provided packet. The 




teacher.  Children were taken out of the classroom during free time for 20–30 minute 
testing sessions until they had completed all performance measures (approximately 
40–50 minutes total administration per subject).  
Graduate research assistants underwent training in administration of all 
performance measures. Training consisted of the research assistant reviewing 
instructions, items, responses, and stimulus materials under the guidance of an 
experienced research assistant prior to assessing child participants. Research 
assistants then observed an experienced researcher administering the assessment to a 
child participant, prior to administering the assessment independently. 
Procedure for analyzing results. Due to data being nested across various 
schools and classrooms, multilevel modeling was suspected as a necessary statistical 
analysis procedure. ICC’s between School and SSIS teacher were calculated to 
determine the need for a multi-level model. Notably, ICC’s were not run with the 
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The intraclass correlation can be estimated from the mean square in the 
ANOVA table. Due to unequal student sample sizes within schools, an unbalanced 
ANOVA was used to determine the ICC using the following formula as the ICC 
estimate:  
 
Where the quantity n’ is estimated by the formula below: 
  
 
Where n is the number of sampled schools, and ni is the number of sampled 
students in school “i”. This quantity can be interpreted as the average ni in the case of 
an unbalanced one-way, random effects ANOVA.  
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ICC’s that are close to zero suggest a negligible effect of variance accounted 
for by the independent variable (e.g., school).  Results of the ICC indicated that the 
school the child attended did not have a significant effect on the teacher’s rating of 
his or her total social competence score or social competence subscale scores. 
Exceptions were the engagement subscale, which showed an ICC of .13 (indicating 
13 percent of the variance in engagement could be accounted for by the school the 
child attended) and the internalizing subscale, which showed an ICC of .16, 
indicating 16 percent of the variance in internalizing behavior could be accounted for 
by the school the child attended.  
 The overall lack of cluster effects at the school level may be a result of the 
homogeneity among schools. Several schools that participated in this study were 
private, religious-based institutions. Additional ICC’s also indicated that school did 
not account for a large amount of variation on the independent variables of ECT, 
TAT, or ToM Verbal score. These data support the use of an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression as an appropriate statistical analyses, as the nested nature of the data 
does not seem to interfere with variation in the outcome measure of interest (e.g., 
SSIS-T total score). Table 2 shows the ICC between School and SSIS-T and between 
















Intraclass Correlation Coefficients* 
*Data were excluded from the analysis if there was only one child with complete data 
from that school. The dataset for this analysis includes 7 schools and 19 teachers (n= 
69 children). 
 
Determining control variables through exploratory analysis. An exploratory 
analysis using zero-order correlations gave guidance to variables that should be 
controlled for in later multiple regression analyses (e.g., vocabulary, age in months, 
school or gender). Correlations among the potential control variables (e.g., 
vocabulary, age and gender) with TAT, ToM, ECT, and SSIS-T and SSIS-P are 
shown in Table 3.  The alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. All analyses 
were conducted with the outlier case (which was 3 standard deviations from the mean 
on the ECT measure) removed. Vocabulary showed significant correlations across all 
independent variables and teacher-rated social skills. Specifically, vocabulary 
correlated with the EID subtest (r(66) = .49, p < .001), ECT Emotion Situations (r(66) 
= .45, p < .001), ECT-combined subtest (r(66) = .56, p < .001), the TAT mean score 
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(r(68) = .40, p = .001), the Level of Abstraction score (r(68) = .39, p = .001), Level of 
Perceptual Integration score (r(68) = .37, p = .002), ToM Verbal score (r(68)= .30, p 
= .01), ToM False Belief score (r(68) = .461, p = .000,  and SSIS-T, r(67) = .44, p < 
.001. Vocabulary also approached statistical significance with ToM Non-False Belief, 
r(68) = .22, p =.069.  However Vocabulary did not relate to SSIS-P, r(57) =.03, p = 
.81. Age in months only showed significant correlations for the TAT mean score 
(r(68) = .38, p = .001), Level of Abstraction (r(68) = .32, p = .008), Level of 
Perceptual Integration (r(68)= .42, p < .001) , ToM Verbal score r(68) = .31, p = .009) 
and ToM Non-False Belief, r(68) = .33, p = .005). Spearman correlations of gender 
were non-significant across all variables. Additionally, Vocabulary showed non-
significant correlations to Age in months, r(68) = .12, p =.336 and Gender, rs (68) = -
.00, p = .981) (not shown in table). A t-test on race (white vs. non-white) on teacher-
rated social skills (t(50) = -.65, p = .521) and parent-rated social skills (t(42) = -.02, p 





Pearson and Spearman Correlations of Vocabulary, Age, and Gender with Select 




Vocabulary Age in months Gender 
ECT-combineda .56*** -.05 .03 
EID .49*** -.11 .01 
Emotion Situations             .45*** .07 .07 
TAT             .40**    .38*** .08 
Abstraction .39*** .32** .09 
Perceptual 
Integration 
.37***   .42*** .05 




ToM False Belief .46***             .14 -.14 
ToM Non-False 
Belief 
             .22 .33** .20 
SSIS-T             .44*** .14 .21 
SSIS-P             .03 .09 .03 
a Combined all items from the ECT Emotion—Identification test and ECT Emotion—
Situations test 
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level  (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 The exploratory analysis suggested that vocabulary, as measured by the 
WPPSI-III, should be controlled for in a regression analysis due to its relationship to 
both independent and dependent variables of interest. In contrast, age in months, 
while relating to several independent variables (e.g., TAT and ToM) did not relate to 
the outcome variable of SSIS-T. The SSIS-T is a normed measure that accounts for 
age of participant in the standard score, therefore, the influence of age in months for 
teacher rated SSIS scores was expected to be negligible. A preliminary MR analysis 
(R2 = .21, F(2, 66) = 8.50 , p =.001) of both vocabulary and age predicting SSIS-T 
scores supported this claim. While vocabulary, β = .432, p <.001, was a significant 
predictor in the model, age was not, β = .096, p = .387. For this reason, only 
vocabulary was controlled for in the multiple regression analyses, discussed below. 
Major Analyses. Descriptive statistics were run on the data using SPSS. 
Mean scores and ranges on all variables are reported in the results section (see Table 
4).  Zero-order correlations and partial correlations (with vocabulary controlled for) 
were run between the TAT and ECT-combined test.  Partial correlations between 
ToM (as measured by the NEPSY-II ToM Verbal subpart, ToM False Belief Score 




situationistic EU measures (ECT-combined test) were also run. Zero-order and partial 
correlations were also run between subcategories of the SSIS (parent and teacher 
versions) and ECT-combined, EID, ECT Emotion Situations, TAT total score, 
Abstraction, Perceptual Integration, ToM Verbal score, ToM False Belief score, and 
ToM Non-False Belief variables. 
A multiple regression (MR) was used to understand how much variability in 
social competence was accounted for by the mentalistic EU, situationistic EU, and 
ToM, as well as what measures accounted for a unique amount of variance in the 
model. Step one of the analyses included vocabulary as a control variable and step 
two included the TAT, NEPSY-II ToM Verbal Score (total of FB and non-FB), and 
the ECT-combined subtest. Appendix E lists all variables used in the analyses and 







Chapter 4: Results 
 
 
Procedure for Missing Data 
Of the 71 participants (N = 70 when the outlier case was removed) there were 
a total of 67 complete cases for the teacher data set and 57 complete cases for the 
parent data set. There were no missing items reported for the TAT or ToM measures. 
One participant was missing the SSIS teacher measure (N = 69), twelve participants 
were missing the SSIS parent measure (N = 58), and two participants were missing 
the ECT-combined measure (N = 68). For the ECT- combined test only 3 of the 70 
(4.2%) participants had missing items. Notably, no participant had greater than a 7% 
rate of missing items on the ECT. Scores for these missing items were determined by 
averaging the participants’ scores across the ECT-combined test and inserting this 
average for the missing item. Participants who gave multiple answers (e.g., scared 
and mad) and did not indicate a single answer when prompted, received a score based 
on an average of their two answers.  
Internal Consistency and Reliability 
The internal consistency was established for the Emotion Identification test, 
the Emotion Situations test and the combined ECT measure. Researchers often 
consider Cronbach’s Alpha of .70 or higher to be in the acceptable range. However, 
Devellis (1990) considered alphas of .60 as undesirable but not unacceptable. With 
the outlier case included, the internal consistency of the Emotion Situations subtest 




ECT-combined subtest (36 items; α = .80) was all within the acceptable range. 
However, after removing the outlier, the internal consistency of the Emotion 
Situations subtest alone (15 items; α = .42) was below the acceptable range while the 
internal consistency of the Emotion Identification subtest (21 items; α = .67) was 
undesirable but not unacceptable. These two measures were combined to form the 
ECT-combined test for several reasons: a) emotion understanding literature considers 
both emotion identification and situation-vignette tasks to be “situationistic-type” EU, 
b) adding the more reliable items from the EID could improve the internal 
consistency issue, and c) the Emotion Situations subtest and Emotion Identification 
subtest showed a statistically significant correlation, r(66) = .39, p=.001, and did not 
indicate a redundancy.  The combined ECT measures’ internal consistency, with the 
outlier case removed, was considered to be in the acceptable range (36 items;  = 
.71). The frequency of correct vs. incorrect answers for the EID and ECT-Situations 
is reported in Appendix D.   
All other measures of internal consistency and reliability were calculated with 
the outlier case removed (N = 70). The internal consistency for the WPSSI-III 
Vocabulary subtest was considered adequate (25 items; α =.81). The internal 
consistency for the TAT Abstraction (6 items; α = .90) and the TAT Perceptual 
Integration (6 items; α = .83) was calculated and found to be adequate. Inter-rater 
reliability was also calculated for the TAT. Due to the archival nature of the data, 
inter-rater reliability for the first half of the participants was already calculated from a 
previous study for Abstraction (ICC (2,1) = .90) and Perceptual Integration (ICC (2,1) 




between the researcher’s ratings and a TAT expert’s ratings. Both raters 
independently coded the same 60 cards (30 Abstraction and 30 Perceptual 
Integration).  The two way random effects ICC for absolute agreement for 
Abstraction (ICC (2,1) = .86) and Perceptual Integration (ICC (2,1) = .90) revealed 
acceptable inter-rater reliability statistics. Additionally, Abstraction and Perceptual 
Integration were highly correlated with each other (r(68) = .85, p < .001).  
The internal consistency for SSIS-T (46 items; α = .95) and SSIS-P (46 items; 
α = .91) was high. For the teacher measure, the subscales for Communication (7 
items; α = .85), Cooperation (6 items; α = .88), Responsibility (6 items; α = .79), 
Empathy (3 items; α = .68), Engagement (6 items, α = .86), Externalizing (12 items; α 
= .90), and Internalizing (7 items; α = .81) were all within adequate ranges. For the 
SSIS-P measure, the subscales for Communication (7 items; α = .69), Cooperation (6 
items; α = .83), Responsibility (6 items; α = .67), Empathy (6 items; α = .83), 
Engagement (7 items; α = .73), Externalizing (12 items; α = .80), and Internalizing 
(10 items; α = .72) were also all within adequate ranges. 
The internal consistency of the full NEPSY ToM subtest (21 items; α = .80; 
full test not used in this study) and the ToM Verbal subpart (15 items; α = .73) were 
adequate. The select items from the ToM Verbal test that were non-FB related (“ToM 
Non-False Belief”; 11 items; α = .66) showed adequate reliability.  However the 
select items from the ToM Verbal test that were false belief tasks (“ToM False 
Belief”; 4 items; α = .45) did not have acceptable internal consistency. A Spearman-
Brown prophecy formula was used to predict the anticipated reliability of a longer 




measure. The new Cronbach alpha calculated for an 8-item ToM False Belief test was 
in the undesirable but not unacceptable range (αnew  = .66). Notably, the ToM False 
Belief and ToM Non-False Belief items that form the ToM Verbal subpart correlated 
with each other, r(68) = .54, p = .000.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the main constructs and their respective measures, 
including Means, standard deviations, and ranges, are summarized in Table 4.  
Although EID, ECT- combined and ToM subtests were all negatively skewed, and the 
SSIS-T subscales of externalization and internalization had a larger positive skew, all 
skew values in the data set were within 2.0, which is considered relatively normal 
(Lomax and Hahs-Vaughn, 2012).  Notably, the SSIS subscales of externalization and 
internalization means and standard deviations were comparable to the normative 
sample reported in the SSIS manual. Analyses revealed one outlier participant whose 
score on the ECT measure was more than 3 standard deviations below the mean. This 
case was excluded from the analyses (unless otherwise stated). Descriptive statistics 
also revealed a considerable amount of missing parent data (N = 57) such that there 
was inadequate power to perform a multiple regression analyses with the parent data 
set. Therefore, parent data were only included for correlational analyses. After 
removing outliers and excluding cases with missing data, there were a total of 67 













 n M SD 
Range 
Skew Potential Actual 
Vocabulary 
 WPSSI Vocab 70 11.64 2.66 1-19 5-16.0 -.37 
Age in Months 70 69.46 4.64 60-78 60-78  .18 
SEU       
EID 68 56.43 4.95 21-63 42-63 -.93 
Emotion Situations 68 38.23 2.73 15-45 31-44 -.48 
ECT-combineda 68 94.65 6.52 36-108 73-105 -.94 
 
MEU       
TAT Mean Score 70 2.50 .68 1.0-4.5 1.0-3.8 -.01 
Abstraction 70 2.43 .66 1.0 -4.0 1.0-4.0 .10 
Perceptual Integration 70 2.57 .76 1.0-5.0 1.0-3.7 -.14 
 
ToM       
ToM Verbal  70 12.04 4.05 0-22 0-20 -.84 
ToM False Belief 70 2.73 1.09 0-4 0-4 -.54 
ToM Non-False Belief 70 9.26 3.35 0-18 0-16 -.65 
Social Competence       
 
SSIS-Parent 59 97.88 12.98 1-145 77-128 .50 
 
Engagement 59 15.03 3.20 0-21 8-21 .29 
Empathy 59 13.10 3.34 0-18 3-18 -.37 
Responsibility 59 12.22 2.70 0-18 5-18 .31 
Externalization 59 7.78 4.40 0-36 0-19 .72 
Communication 59 16.42 2.70 0-21 11-21 -.05 
Cooperation 59 13.07 2.43 0-18 8-18 .60 
Internalizing 59 4.12 3.21 0-21 0-12 -.48 
       
SSIS-Teacher 69 99.03 13.52 1-145 70-130 .09 
 
Engagement 69 14.90 3.43 0-21 5-21 -.41 
Empathy 69 11.86 3.27 0-18 4-18 -.29 
Responsibility 69 12.62 3.21 0-18 5-18 -.20 
Externalization 69 5.25 5.36 0-36 0-21 1.06 
Communication 69 15.33 3.39 0-28 6-21 -.36 




Internalizing 69 2.26 2.72 0-30 0-13 1.57 
       
Note. SEU = situationistic Emotion Understanding; MEU = mentalistic Emotion 
Understanding 




RQ1) Are situationistic EU and mentalistic EU distinct constructs? How 
do they relate to each other and to external correlates? 
 Hypothesis 1a predicted that there would be a small-to-negligible, non-
significant correlation between situationistic and mentalistic EU. A Pearson 
correlation between the TAT and ECT-combined measures showed a small, positive 
correlation, r(66)= .35, p = .003.  However, when controlling for vocabulary, the 
correlation was weak and non-significant, r(65) = .17, p = .158. Therefore Hypothesis 
1a was supported.   
Hypothesis 1b predicted that situationistic and mentalistic EU would have 
distinct relations to external correlates when controlling for vocabulary. Specifically, 
mentalistic EU would relate to ToM but situationistic EU would not. Without 
controlling for vocabulary, Pearson’s correlation showed a moderate, positive, 
significant correlation between the TAT mean score and the ToM Verbal score (r(66) 
= .44, p < .001), ToM False Belief score (r(66) = .27, p=.02), and ToM Non-False 
Belief Score, r(66) =.45, p < .001. The correlation between the ECT and ToM Verbal 
(r(66) = .39, p  = .001), ToM False Belief (r(66) = .308, p = .011), and ToM Non-
False Belief (r(66) = .37, p = .002) also showed positive and statistically significant 
correlations.  With controlling for vocabulary, both the TAT (r(67) = .37, p = .002) 




smaller, correlation to the ToM Verbal measure. A similar pattern was observed for 
the ToM Non-False Belief with the TAT (r(67) =.41, p = .001) and the ECT-
combined (r(67)= .30, p = .012). No significant correlations were observed for ToM 
False Belief with the TAT (r(67) = .13, p = .36) or the ECT-combined, r(67) = .07, p 
= .585. Overall, Hypothesis 1b was not supported.  
Hypothesis 1c predicted that mentalistic EU and situationistic EU would relate 
differently to various subcategories of social competence within the SSIS. Mentalistic 
EU was expected to relate to the Engagement, Empathy, Responsibility, and 
Externalizing subscales on the SSIS, whereas situationistic EU was expected to relate 
to the Communication, Cooperation and Internalizing subscales. Hypothesis 1c was 
partially supported—across raters, the TAT related to several SSIS subscales, even 
after vocabulary was controlled for, however, the ECT did not relate to any SSIS 
subscales. Relations between EU and specific scales are described next.     
Teacher-rated SSIS subscales. Mentalistic EU, as measured by the TAT 
mean score, showed statistically significant positive correlations to all teacher-rated 
SSIS subscales of interest, including engagement (r(67) = .32, p = .007), empathy 
(r(67) = .28, p = .018), and responsibility (r(67) = .49, p < .001), and a negative 
correlation to externalizing (r(67) = -.46, p <.001), without vocabulary controlled for.  
Although it was not hypothesized, the TAT mean score positively correlated with 
communication (r(67) = .33, p = .005) and cooperation (r(67) = .46, p < .001), and 
negatively correlated with internalizing, r(67) = -.24, p = .051. Similarly, Abstraction 
correlated with all SSIS subscales and Perceptual Integration correlated with all 




engagement (r(66) = .24, p = .047), responsibility (r(66) = .39, p = .001), 
externalizing (r(66) = -.38, p = .001), and cooperation (r(66) = .36, p =.003) 
maintained their significant correlations to the TAT. With vocabulary controlled for, 
Abstraction correlated with the same subscales, with the addition of a small 
correlation with the communication subscale. Perceptual Integration only correlated 
with the responsibility, externalizing, and cooperation subscales. Furthermore, 
Abstraction showed stronger correlations to SSIS-T subscales overall compared to 
Perceptual Integration, with and without vocabulary controlled for.  The TAT mean 
score, as well as the Abstraction and Perceptual Integration category correlations, are 
reported in Table 5.   
The ToM Verbal Scale of the NEPSY-II correlated with several teacher-rated 
SSIS subscales, approaching statistical significance with engagement (r(67) = .23, p = 
.06), showing statistical significant correlations with responsibility (r(67) = .29, p = 
.017), a negative correlation to externalizing (r(67)= -.34, p = .004), and a positive 
correlation to cooperation (r (67) = .36, p = .003), without vocabulary controlled. The 
ToM False Belief items also correlated with engagement (r(67) = .30, p = .011), 
responsibility (r(67) =.24, p = .047), externalizing (r (67)= -.24, p = .052), and 
cooperation (r(67) = .29, p = .015). The ToM Non-False Belief measure correlated 
with responsibility (r(67) = .26, p = .03), externalizing (r(67) = -.33, p = .006), and 
cooperation, r(67) = .32, p = .008. With vocabulary controlled, only externalizing (r 
(66) = -.27, p = .026) and cooperation (r (66) = .27, p = .026) subscales maintained 
their statistical significance with ToM Verbal. Similarly, the Non-False Belief score 




.26, p =.033. No SSIS subscales related to ToM False Belief when vocabulary was 
controlled for.  
 Situationistic EU as measured by the ECT-combined test showed non-
significant correlations across the selected SSIS-T subtests with and without 
vocabulary controlled for. Subtests of the ECT-combined test also showed non-
significant correlations across SSIS-T subtests, with one exception: the Emotions 
Situations subtest correlated with the SSIS-T scale of cooperation (r(65) = .24, p = 
.047) but was not significant when vocabulary was controlled, r(65) = .08, p = .521.  
Parent-rated SSIS subscales. Without vocabulary controlled for, mentalistic 
EU as measured by the TAT showed statistically significant, positive correlations to 
parent-rated SSIS subscales of responsibility (r(57) = .26, p = .045), externalization 
(r(57) = -.34, p = .009), and cooperation, r(57) = .27, p = .040. Abstraction correlated 
with responsibility and externalization subscales and Perceptual Integration correlated 
responsibility, externalization, and cooperation. With vocabulary controlled, 
responsibility (r(56) = .26, p = .045), externalization (r(56) = -.34, p = .008), and 
cooperation (r(56) = .27, p = .040) maintained their statistically significant 
correlations. Additionally, internalization (r(56) = -.31, p = .016) showed a 
statistically significant correlation to the TAT when vocabulary was controlled. 
Similarly, Abstraction and Perceptual Integration showed correlations to these same 
subscales, with the exception of Abstraction and the responsibility subscale, which 
only neared statistical significant, r(56) = .25, p = .060.  
Without vocabulary controlled, the ToM Verbal measure related to empathy, 




= .25, p = .060. ToM False Belief also related to empathy (r(57) = .26, p = .046), 
externalizing (r(57)  = -.27, p = .041), and communication, r(57) =.30, p = .025. The 
ToM Non-False Belief measure only correlated with empathy, r(57) = .28, p = .033. 
With vocabulary controlled, ToM Verbal continued to relate to empathy (r(56) = .31, 
p = .016) and approached a statistical significant correlation to cooperation, r(56) = 
.25, p = .062. ToM False Belief also continued to relate to empathy (r(56) = .30, p = 
.023) and externalizing (r(56) = -.27, p = .041), and approached a statistically 
significant correlation with communication, r(56) = .26, p =.052. ToM Non-False 
Belief also continued to relate to empathy, r(56)= .286, p = .029.  
With and without vocabulary controlled for, there were no significant 
correlations between parent-rated SSIS subscales and situationistic EU, as measured 
by the combined ECT measure. For the Emotion Identification and Emotion 
Situations subtests of the ECT, all correlations were also non-significant, although for 
Emotion Situations and the SSIS Communication subscale, the correlation 
approached statistical significance, r(54) = -.26, p = .058. Table 5 (teacher SSIS 
subscales) and Table 6 (parent SSIS subscales) summarize the correlations between 

















Correlations between Teacher SSIS subscales and the TAT, ToM, and the ECT 
  
 Engag. Emp. Resp. Extern. Comm. Coop. Internalizing 


























































ToM FB .30* .19 .24* -.24 .19 .29 .01 
 (.20) (.05) (.04) (-.10) (-.01) (.13) (.10) 
ToM Non-
FB .17 .16 .26* -.33** .15 .32** -.08 














































Note. Parenthesis “()” indicates vocabulary was controlled for.  
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 













Correlations between Parent SSIS subscales and TAT, ToM, and the ECT 
 
Note. Parenthesis “()” indicates vocabulary was controlled for.  
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 Engag. Emp. Resp. Extern. Comm. Coop. Internalizing 


























































ToM FB .10 .26* .23 -.27* .30* .20 .17 
 (.15) (.30*) (.22) (-.27*) (.26) (.23) (.03) 
ToM Non-FB .02 .28* .23 -.20 .12 .22 .10 




















































RQ2) When taken together, do situationistic and mentalistic EU and ToM 
predict a significant amount of variation in social competence as rated by 
teachers even when controlling for vocabulary? 
Prior to conducting a hierarchical multiple regression, the relevant 
assumptions of this statistical analysis were tested. Residual and scatter plots of 
independent variables (ECT-combined, TAT, and ToM Verbal) and the dependent 
variable (SSIS-T) indicated that the assumptions of normality, linearity, and 
homogeneity of variance were met. Collinearity statistics were all within accepted 
limits (e.g., tolerance was greater than .10 and the variance inflation factor was less 
than 10 across independent variables), and examinations of the Mahalanobis and 
Cooke’s distance scores indicated no multivariate outliers.  The Durbin-Watson 
statistic was computed to evaluate independence of errors and was 1.90, which is 
considered acceptable and suggests that the assumption of independent errors was 
also met.  
 Hypothesis 2 stated that a model with ECT-combined, TAT, and ToM Verbal 
would predict a significant amount of variance in teacher-rated social competence 
when controlling for vocabulary. A hierarchical multiple regression was used, where 
the WPSSI-III Vocabulary subtest was entered in step 1 and ECT, ToM Verbal, and 
the TAT were entered together in step 2. Results of the hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis revealed that at step 1, Vocabulary contributed significantly to the 
regression model (F(1, 65) = 15.32, p < .001) and accounted for 19.1% of variation in 




additional 12.1% of the variation in SSIS-T and this change in R2 was significant, F 
Change (3, 62) = 3.63, p = .018. Together, all four independent variables accounted 
for 31.2% of the variance in SSIS-T.  
RQ3) Will mentalistic EU remain a significant predictor of teacher-rated 
social competence in a model that includes situationistic EU and ToM, 
controlling for vocabulary?   
Hypothesis 3 stated that mentalistic EU would be a significant predictor in the 
model described in research question 2. When all four independent variables were 
included in the regression model, neither ECT-combined (β  = -.201; t =-1.46, df = 
62, p = .148) nor ToM Verbal (β = .103; t =. 84, df = 62, p =. 406) were significant 
predictors of SSIS-T. Both Vocabulary (β =. 398; t = 2.98, df = 62, p = .004) and the 
TAT mean score (β  = .329; t = 2.65, df = 62, p = .010) were significant predictors in 
the full model. Table 7 displays results of the hierarchical multiple regression 

















Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Teacher rated Social 
Competence from Situationistic Emotion Understanding, Theory of Mind, and 




Predictor  β 
Step 1 .19***  
Vocabularya 
                        .44*** 
Step 2                 .12*  
Vocabulary                         .40** 
ECT-combined                        -.20 
ToM Verbal                         .10 






a. Control Variable 



























Table 8  
Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
 
Hypotheses Results 
H1a) There is a low or non-significant 
correlation between situationistic and 
mentalistic EU.  
 
 
H1b) Mentalistic EU relates to ToM but 
situationistic EU does not.  
 
 
H1c) Mentalistic EU relates to 
Engagement, Empathy, Responsibility, 
and Externalizing subscales on the SSIS, 
whereas situationistic EU relates to the 
Communication, Cooperation and 
Internalizing subscales. 
 
Supported. Situationistic EU and 
mentalistic EU did not correlate to each 
other once vocabulary was controlled 
for.  
 
Not Supported. Both EU types related 
to Non-FB ToM with vocabulary 
controlled for.  
 
Partially Supported. Mentalistic EU 
related to: 
• Teacher rated SSIS for 
Engagement, Responsibility, 
Cooperation, and Externalizing 
subskills. 
 
• Parent rated SSIS for 
Responsibility, Cooperation, 
Externalizing, and Internalizing 
subskills. 
 
Situationistic EU did not relate to any 
SSIS subscales across raters and with 
vocabulary controlled for. 
 
H2) Mentalistic EU, situationistic EU and 
ToM account for a significant amount of 
variance in teacher-rated social 




Supported.  The full model was 
significant. 
H3) Mentalistic EU will be a significant 
predictor in the model of teacher rated 
social competence. 
  Supported. Only Vocabulary and 
mentalistic EU were significant 






Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
 
This study sought to clarify emotion understanding theory by investigating 
how mentalistic and situationistic EU relate to each other, to ToM, to overall social 
competence, and to subcategories of social competence. This study used a novel 
storytelling task as its mentalistic EU measure. This task is thought to require similar 
demands to ToM tasks, as both showcase inner states (desires, thoughts, and 
perspectives) that can differ across individuals. Therefore, a correlation between 
mentalistic EU and ToM scores was expected. Results supported this relationship 
between mentalistic EU and ToM, with and without vocabulary controlled for, but 
only for the ToM Verbal and ToM Non-False Belief tasks—which are considered a 
broader measure of ToM. In contrast, the more traditional EU measure of 
situationistic EU skills, which did not necessarily require mental understanding, was 
not expected to correlate with ToM.  However, results showed that situationistic EU 
had a significant, albeit small, correlation to ToM Verbal and ToM Non-False Belief 
tasks, with and without vocabulary controlled. Situationistic and mentalistic EU, as 
hypothesized distinct constructs, were also expected to correlate to different aspects 
of social competence, as rated by teachers and parents. Results partially supported 
this; mentalistic EU (as measured by the TAT mean score) related to more social skill 
categories than proposed, across raters and even with vocabulary controlled for. In 
contrast, situationistic EU (when measured by the ECT-combined measure) did not 
relate to any of the expected social skill subgroups across raters. Furthermore, 




among teacher raters (viz., they both related to responsibility, externalization, and 
cooperation without vocabulary controlled for and externalization and cooperation 
with vocabulary controlled for). This pattern was not shown in parent raters. 
However, ToM did relate to parent-rated empathy. Lastly, mentalistic EU, being a 
more advanced form of social processing, was hypothesized to be an important 
predictor of kindergartners’ social competence. Results supported this hypothesis. 
While a model with Vocabulary, situationistic EU, mentalistic EU, and ToM 
accounted for a significant amount of the variance in teacher-rated social skills, only 
Vocabulary and mentalistic EU were significant predictors in this model. General 
conclusions are that mentalistic EU is distinct from situationistic EU but that both 
Emotion Understanding types are related to general ToM skills.  Additionally, 
mentalistic EU relates to specific social competence skills, and is an important 
predictor of kindergartners’ overall social competence, as rated by teachers. A 
detailed discussion of these findings and emerging patterns are discussed below 
within the context of the major research questions.  
Relationships Among Constructs 
Research question 1 investigated whether situationistic EU (as measured by a 
combined emotion identification and vignette-style task) and mentalistic EU (as 
measured by a storytelling task) were distinct constructs and how they related to each 
other and to external correlates. While results are not conclusive, the study findings 
support the hypothesis that situationistic and mentalistic EU are distinct constructs 
that relate to different social information processing abilities. As expected, when 




significant correlation with each other.  Unexpectedly, both mentalistic and 
situationistic EU did show a statistically significant, medium correlation with ToM 
Verbal and ToM Non-False Belief, even when vocabulary was controlled for. One 
explanation is that situationistic EU does not exclude the kind of mental 
understanding that is inherent in ToM tasks.  Rather, situationistic EU—exercising 
knowledge and understanding of the effects of external events on someone’s 
emotions—may feed into ToM development. Notably, neither situationistic nor 
mentalistic EU related to the False Belief component of the ToM measure. Instead, 
results indicate that the correlation between emotion understanding tasks and the 
composite ToM Verbal measure was largely driven by the ToM Non-False Belief 
items. This distinction is explored further below.  
ToM false belief vs. ToM non-false belief. This study attempted to pair the 
storytelling measure of mentalistic EU with ToM tasks that were based on similar 
task demands. The study found that Non-False Belief ToM was the best correlate to 
emotion understanding. Instead of contrasting opposite beliefs, or knowledge states, 
such as in the False Belief ToM, items of the Non-False Belief ToM involved 
realizing, in general, that others have different perspectives, being able to move away 
from literal interpretations of pictures and statements, and using mental language 
(e.g., identifying when someone is thinking). These ToM skills represent a high level 
of social reasoning and mind understanding and are not as narrow as false belief 
measures.  The relationship between ToM Non-False Belief and both Emotion 




broader measures of EU (such as storytelling) in order to appropriately match task 
demands between each measure of the construct.  
Notably, results from the literature on ToM and Emotion Understanding 
studies partially mirror the results of this study. In Weimer and colleagues’ (2012) 
study, they found that mentalistic EU did not relate to ToM as measured by False 
Belief tasks. This finding was consistent with the current study, but contrasts with the 
current study’s finding that mentalistic EU related to non-False Belief ToM.  
Therefore, future work in relating ToM and mentalistic understanding should 
consider the wider range of ToM skills involved in mental state understanding.  
Results also hold implications for users of the NEPSY-II ToM subtest. The 
false belief items on the NEPSY-II ToM subtest showed only a moderate correlation 
to the non-false belief items, which together comprised the ToM Verbal subpart. 
Additionally, these subcomponents of the ToM Verbal subpart differentially related 
to social skills and emotion understanding. Practitioners should therefore consider the 
breadth and diversity of the ToM construct when using the NEPSY-II subtest and 
when considering the implications of a child’s ToM score. Practitioners may want to 
look at these false belief items separately from the rest of the measure, as they 
represent a distinct form of ToM that may indicated different aspects of a child’s 
social skill aptitude.  
ToM and social skills. ToM showed some similarity to mentalistic EU, in 
that both related to select social skill subcomponents. Specifically, both ToM Non-
False Belief and mentalistic EU related to externalizing (e.g., items related to self-




SSIS, even after vocabulary was controlled for, while situationistic EU (as measured 
by the ECT-combined scales) did not relate to these subscales. One explanation is that 
while situationistic EU involves knowledge of social information (e.g., rules, 
information, and cues), both ToM and mentalistic Emotion Understanding involve 
ongoing cognitive-emotional processes that require connecting outside events (such 
as rules) to inside events (such as thoughts and self-control). In this way, mentalistic 
understanding and other mind understanding skills, may actually be a better indicator 
for cooperation than situationistic Emotion Understanding, but only among teacher 
raters. Teachers must implement many routines, oversee classroom rules, and give 
directions to students for assignments, activities, and transitions between classes. 
However, parents may not find children’s’ rule-following as salient in the home 
context, which may not have the same structured routines as school. 
However, there were select SSIS subscales unique to only parent raters. For 
example, ToM (both the Verbal score and the False Belief score) and empathy were 
only correlated for parent raters, even when vocabulary was controlled. Empathy 
items included the frequency with which the child tried to comfort others, forgave 
others, and tried to understand how others feel—all skills that are expected to relate to 
mental state understanding and perspective taking. Furthermore, overall, False Belief 
scores (as compared to Non-False Belief) was a stronger correlate to other SSIS 
subscales for parents, as compared to teachers. Where for teachers ToM (specifically, 
only the Non-False Belief task) related to externalizing and cooperation, for parents, 
only False Belief ToM related to externalization and communication (e.g., saying 




tone of voice). Why parents would find stronger connections between empathy and 
ToM and why False Belief relates to externalization and communication among 
parents but not teachers is still unclear. Parents may be more sensitive to their child’s 
empathic behavior: parents are well-situated to either view, or be part of, one-on-one 
conversations and intimate social interactions, where a child can show their 
developing empathic skills. Similarly, the SSIS subscale of communication also 
involves, or is best observed, in one-on-one interactions with the child and a 
peer/adult. Again, these dialogues may be more readily observed in a home context.  
A school context, by contrast, might involve several students and multiple 
conversations occurring in the classroom, making observations of nuanced social 
interactions difficult. 
Emotion understanding and social skills. Overall results of comparing 
mentalistic EU and situationistic EU to social skill components showed that 
mentalistic EU related to more social skill categories than situationistic EU, after 
vocabulary was controlled, for both parent and teacher raters. As expected, 
mentalistic EU positively related to social competence subscales that involved 
popularity with peers and successful free play (e.g., the engagement subscale), but for 
teacher-ratings only. Mentalistic EU also positively related to responsibility and 
negatively related to externalizing problems, as rated by both parents and teachers, 
even when controlling for vocabulary. Unexpectedly, mentalistic EU, which was 
proposed to relate to noticing social nuances, did not relate to the empathy subscale 
once vocabulary was controlled for across raters. Furthermore, as discussed in the 




following (i.e., the cooperation subscale), for both parent and teacher raters. 
Additionally, the TAT mean score related to internalizing behavior; however, this 
association held only when vocabulary was not controlled for teacher ratings of SSIS 
and only when vocabulary was controlled for parent-rated SSIS.  Overall, parent and 
teacher ratings showed similar results across SSIS scales, with the exception of 
engagement (only teacher raters, with and without vocabulary controlled, showed a 
correlation) and internalizing (only parent raters showed a correlation, when 
vocabulary was controlled).  Results pertaining to mentalistic EU, situationistic EU, 
and each SSIS subscale are reviewed in further detail below.  
Mentalistic EU’s relationship to the SSIS-T engagement scale suggests that 
children who can readily infer others’ emotions from ambiguous social scenes are 
more likely to interact well with other children, start conversations with peers and 
adults, and make friends easily.  Notably, only teacher raters perceived engagement 
as relating to children’s’ mentalistic EU. This may be due to teachers’ increased 
likelihood of witnessing and observing broad social interactions with peers in the 
classroom and with teachers being able to compare a student’s social behavior to the 
wide range of social behaviors they witness in their classroom and over the course of 
their teaching career. Additionally, while the connection between engagement and 
mentalistic EU supports a role for mentalistic EU’s in exhibiting prosocial behavior, 
research has also shown that children’s capacity to understand others’ feelings may 
also help them to be more effective in eliciting prosocial behavior from others.  
Studies have shown that peer ratings of popularity on sociometric measures were 




Howes, Phillipsen & Hamilton, 1993). Further research might use both sociometric 
measures filled out by children’s’ peers (e.g., popularity ratings), in addition to social 
competency ratings from observers, teachers, and parents, to further detail the social 
benefits of mentalistic Emotion Understanding from various viewpoints.  
Another difference between parent and teacher raters was the role of 
vocabulary in the correlation between the internalizing SSIS subscale and mentalistic 
EU. Importantly, teachers only showed a statistically significant correlation when 
vocabulary was not controlled for, while parents only showed a correlation when 
vocabulary was controlled. The internalization subscale (e.g., “acts lonely”, “is 
anxious with others,” “acts sad or depressed”) measures the nuanced construct of 
behaviors associated with prominent negative feelings and perceptions about the self 
and social environments, and also gauges negative mood.  These characteristics and 
their severity may be less noticeable to teachers in a large classroom. Furthermore a 
student who is more verbal and shows internalizing behavior (e.g., communicates and 
shares with the teacher that they are lonely or anxious) will be more noticeable in a 
large classroom than a child who is quiet but also feels the same emotions. This may 
explain why after vocabulary was controlled, teacher ratings of their students’ 
internalizing behaviors were no longer connected to the student’s mentalistic EU, 
while parent ratings became significant after vocabulary was controlled. The home 
context may be well-suited to parents’ noticing internalizing behaviors, as when the 
children display cues of internalization, these may be more easily noticed in a smaller 
setting: even when they do not verbalize an issue, a shift in mood at home is more 




understand others’ desires, beliefs, and emotions in social contexts and internalizing 
behavior showcases a connection between mind understanding and socio-emotional 
health.  
Mentalistic EU’s relationship to the responsibility SSIS subscale (e.g., “is well 
behaved when unsupervised”) and negative relationship to the externalization SSIS 
subscale (“has difficulty waiting their turn”), as rated by parents and teacher and 
when vocabulary was controlled for, show that mentalistic EU has connections to 
demonstrating appropriate behavior—especially during unstructured or unsupervised 
moments where the correct behavior and rules are not necessarily made explicit. This 
mirrors the unstructured nature of the storytelling task, which in part required the 
participant to organize, structure, and monitor their “behavior” (i.e., the story) with 
little structure or guidance on what was appropriate or not appropriate for the story. 
Therefore, mentalistic EU’s relationship to responsibility and externalization 
behaviors may be an artifact of the TAT task demands, which, arguably, required 
forms of self-control and executive functioning. However, one may argue that real-
world emotion understanding consists of similar behaviors inherent in interpreting a 
social scene—the need to organize and structure internal processes and form an 
interpretation of the social scene requires attention to detail, self-control, and 
executive functioning, to determine what details are most important/relevant (e.g., not 
being distracted by everyone laughing at a joke in the room, noticing a friend isn’t 
laughing, and then inferring the friend’s feelings are hurt).  
Mentalistic EU also related to the SSIS cooperation scale, as rated by both 




knowledge and adherence to explicit rules and expectations (e.g., “follows your 
directions”). Additionally, while the ECT Emotion Situations subtest did relate to the 
cooperation subscale as rated by teachers, this relationship became non-significant, 
once vocabulary was controlled. 
Unexpectedly, situationistic EU (as measured by the ECT-combined test) did 
not relate to any social skill subscales across raters, with some correlations, while 
non-significant, even showing a negative direction. Notably, for the ECT Emotion 
Situations subtest, without vocabulary controlled for, there was a significant, but 
negative, correlation with cooperation for teacher raters and a negative correlation 
approaching significance, with the communication subscale, for parent raters. These 
results must be interpreted with caution, given the low internal consistency of the 
Emotion Situations subtest when the outlier case was removed. However, taken at 
face value, these results imply that high situationistic EU, or knowledge of common 
emotions and their connection to prototypical social situations, relates to a disregard 
of directions or classroom rules. Similarly, situationistic EU is also indicative of not 
saying “please and thank you,” taking turns in conversations, etc. Given the breadth 
of literature on situationistic EU’s connections (positive correlations) to these social 
skills, these results are most likely an artifact of the measure used (the ECT) and not 
indicative of the construct itself.   
Therefore, these results suggest that the ECT measure and its corresponding 
subtests may not have been appropriate to use with this age group. Specifically, the 
ECT was originally adapted from the ACES, to work with the preschool age group. 




severe ceiling effects were indicated, the measure showed a negative skew, indicating 
that most participants displayed relatively high situationistic EU skills. While the 
population of 5 to 6 year olds was chosen in order to tap into their mentalistic EU 
capabilities, further research should either include a wider age range (e.g., 4 to 6 year 
olds) where situationistic EU skills are also still developing, or consider a cross-
sectional approach that investigates 3-, 4-, 5- and 6-year-olds’ emotion understanding 
capabilities.  
Overall, these findings provide some support for the hypothesis that 
mentalistic EU and situationistic EU are different constructs, however ToM (Non-
False Belief tasks) seems to be involved in both Emotion Understanding skills. 
Results should be interpreted with caution given the unexpected direction of the 
correlations between situationistic EU and many of the social skill subscales. Future 
work should consider using a different situationistic Emotion Understanding task 
developed specifically for older populations (which will include a wider variation of 
scores) when comparing and contrasting with Emotion Understanding to ToM and 
other external correlates.  
Vocabulary and social skills. Results indicated that the relationship between 
vocabulary and social skills varied by the rater, with teacher raters perceiving social 
skills as more language-mediated then parents. Once vocabulary was controlled, 
teacher correlations of emotion understanding and ToM to specific social skills 
disappeared. Specifically, for teachers, there were no longer correlations between 
empathy or communication and mentalistic EU (TAT score), between responsibility 




contrast, most of the parents’ ratings stayed statistically significant or gained 
statistical significance (e.g., internalizing behavior) after vocabulary was controlled—
possibly due to parent perceptions of social skills being less language-mediated. 
These results provided preliminary support to suggest teachers may view social skills 
as partially interwoven with “language,” whereas parents may view social skills 
through a different lens.  Future studies should consider the importance of “blended” 
constructs (e.g., parent raters may be picking up on the social skills of children with 
high mentalistic EU and vocabulary) as a result of rater perceptions rather than 
merely the nature of the task demands. Importantly, further refining of how a 
construct measured via a performance task translates to real world behavior that a 
teacher might observe and perceive in the classroom is also important. For example, 
vocabulary subtests (such as the WPSSI-III subtest which measured verbal fluency, 
concept formation, word knowledge, and word usage) are considered a subcomponent 
of crystallized intelligence and correlates well with Verbal and Full Scale IQ (Sattler, 
2008). Teachers may therefore, notice intelligent children as more likely to be social 
competent while the child’s intelligence is less salient to parent perceptions of a 
child’s social competence.  
Predicting Social Competence 
Research question 2 investigated whether, when taken together, situationistic 
and mentalistic EU and ToM predicted a significant amount of variation in social 
competence as rated by teachers, even when controlling for vocabulary. Results 
supported the hypothesis that these three variables predict a significant amount of 




variance, and situationistic EU, mentalistic EU, and ToM accounted for 12.1% of the 
variance above and beyond vocabulary. 
 While this piece alone supports the literature in its claim that these aspects of 
social cognition are precursors to social competence, investigating research question 
3 revealed that only vocabulary and mentalistic EU were significant predictors in the 
full model. These results support the importance of mentalistic EU as unique and 
integral predictor for kindergarteners’ social competence, as rated by teachers. 
Incorporating mentalistic EU skills into social competence interventions may improve 
children’s social-emotional development. A recent study by Ornaghi et al. (2014) 
trained school-age children in Emotion Understanding over the course of a 2-month 
intervention program.  After reading illustrated scenarios based on emotional scripts, 
the training group engaged in conversations on Emotion Understanding (whereas the 
control group was simply asked to produce a drawing about the story). Importantly, 
the training sessions focused on guided discussion of both the external and internal 
causes that elicited the target emotion, the possibility that individuals may experience 
mixed emotions, and reflection on their own and their peers’ likely emotions in that 
situation. Results showed that the training group outperformed the control group on 
emotion comprehension, theory of mind, and empathy.  
 Notably, despite using a diverse set of ToM tasks, ToM Verbal failed to make 
a contribution to teacher-rated social competence beyond the contribution of 
mentalistic EU and vocabulary. While some studies have found that ToM did not 
relate to global social skills, as rated by teachers and observers (Cassidy et al., 2003), 




et al., 1999). A major difference between these studies is the type of social skill 
measure employed. With measures that ask teachers to compare the student’s social 
skills to other children their age, there are more positive results and significant 
correlations to general social skills, but less so with measures that ask the teacher to 
rate the frequency of a certain behavior. This may be because the former 
measurement type is similar to peer-likeability ratings, which the literature has also 
shown to have a positive relation to ToM (Cassidy et al., 2003). The current study 
utilized a measure that only asked for frequency of the social behavior, which does 
not allow the rater to report the level of quality of the behavior or to compare the 
child to their peers. It is possible that a different social skills measure may have 
elicited a correlation with ToM.  
Conclusions 
Review of the literature shows that links between EU and ToM and between 
EU and social competence vary depending on child age, type of measure used, and 
matched task demands between measures. This study brings some clarity to these 
relationships by deliberately contrasting situationistic and mentalistic EU measures 
and relating them to ToM (measured by both False Belief and advanced components 
of ToM) and to parent-and-teacher-rated social competence. 
Overall results of the study indicate that teachers and parents do perceive 
children with more “mind” understanding (i.e., mentalistic EU and ToM) to be more 
socially competent. These findings add to the Emotion Understanding literature’s 
discussion of how mentalistic EU relates to children’s social competence. Further 




Understanding that match the task demands of expansive ToM tasks, and not only 
involve navigating and representing different perspectives, thoughts, desires, and 
beliefs, but also requires other kinds of mental understanding (e.g., being able to 
interpret a social scene, moving from a literal understanding to a conceptual 
understanding of someone’s actions or meaning). The similarities and differences 
between mentalistic EU and ToM should also be further investigated, to ascertain 
how one may feed into the other. Finally, mentalistic EU should be further related to 
various social skills, as rated by parents, teachers, and the children themselves, as 
well as by observers of the classroom.  
Limitations 
There were several limitations of the study due to the archival nature of the 
data. A major limitation is the ECT measure, whose ECT Emotion Situations subtest 
did not show adequate internal consistency once the outlier was removed. The ACES 
measure on which the ECT was based is commonly used; however, there are 
variations in the literature on how it is scored. A three-point scoring system was used 
in this study. A more strict, binary scoring system, however, may have been more 
appropriate to use with the older age group. Another limitation is that, while the study 
sought to differentiate between aspects of Emotion Understanding and its relationship 
to higher-order mind understanding, these constructs are likely intertwined with each 
other. For example, it is difficult to only measure situationistic EU, even if the task is 
largely structured to elicit situational knowledge, as a child with advanced mentalistic 
EU may still bring in those skills to provide a nuanced interpretation of the provided 




character is pushed in the hallway, but the child may create a context to the story 
where, say, the character should actually feel more “sad” than “mad,” because this is 
a small, tight-knit, school, where everyone is close, so being picked on becomes a 
surprising act rather than a threatening one). In the same way, the TAT most likely 
measures more than just one aspect of mentalistic EU. As discussed above, it most 
likely entails aspects of self-control and self-monitoring to complete the task. This 
may be a necessary trade-off in order to provide a task that fits closely to ToM. Both 
tasks might involve open-ended questions, prompts to contrast others’ thoughts and 
desires, detail different perspectives, and require reasoning beyond the literal 
interpretation. Finally, the low number of participants in the parent sample precluded 
a multiple regression analysis, which would have strengthened the final conclusions 
of the study and further delineated the observed patterns of ToM, mentalistic EU, and 





  Appendix A: Review of Emotion Understanding 
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Social Skills Improvement System (SSIS)—The SSIS assesses social skills and 
behavioral problems.  The questions refer to such behaviors as “following rules” or 




Social Skills Improvement System (SSIS)—Same as above, but some items may be 
changed to reflect the classroom context. 
 
Activities administered to the child one-on-one: 
These are given in two 30-minute sessions with a doctoral student in school 
psychology. 
 
1. Vocabulary portion of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence-Third Edition, (WPPSI-III). Child points to pictures of named 
items and defines words.  
2. Emotion Comprehension Test. Child identifies emotions from pictures and 
indicates how a child would feel about certain situations—such as when 
another child cuts in line.  
3. Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). A storytelling task where the child views 
a stimulus card with a picture of characters and identifies the problem, the 
causal sequences, the inner thoughts, feelings, and intentions of the characters, 
and means-end connections. 
4. Neuropsychological Evaluation (NEPSY-II) Theory of Mind subtest involves 







Appendix D: Emotion Understanding Measures 
 
 





I’m going to tell you about some kids your age. I want you to tell me how they feel.  
Tell me if you think they would feel happy, sad, mad, or scared.  Sometimes you might 
think they feel two feelings, like both mad and sad.  If you think there is more than 
one feeling, tell me both (If they say two, circle both.  Then follow up by asking 
which they think the child feels more strongly and put an asterisk by that feeling). 
Sometimes the child may not have any feeling, and you can tell me that by saying, "no 
feeling."  Don't say "no feeling" just because you're not sure how they would feel, 
though.  If you think they would have any feeling, I want you to take a guess at what it 
is, okay? We will use puppets and call the children by the color of their shirt.( Make 
an R next to the item if they ask for a repeat. Follow up with the highlighted items 
after you have completed all of the questions).  
 



























Green’s parents said that 
they would take the family to 
the fair. But when it is time 
to go they say that they 
cannot go. How do you think 
Green feels: happy, sad, mad 
scared, or no feeling?  
Follow up: (Re-read the 
prompt.) You said that 
Green felt _____. Tell me 
more about Green feeling 
_______. (After response) 
Is there anything more you 
would like to say about 



















Green just finished coloring 
















demonstrates with Red 
puppet: “It looks really 
nice.” How do you think 
Green feels: happy, sad, mad 



























Green always took care of 
the family’s kitten. Green 
really loves this kitten. But 
the kitten is gone and won’t 
come back. How do you 
think Green feels: happy, 







































Green is walking down the 
hall and sees a big kid 
walking toward him. 
Narrator demonstrates 
with Red puppet: “Get out 
of my way!” How do you 
think Green feels: happy, 



































Green built a big tower of 
blocks. Red came over and 
knocked them down and then 
laughed. How do you think 
Green feels: happy, sad, mad 
































Green let Red play with 
Green’s favorite toy. Red 
plays with the toy and then it 
breaks. How do you think 
Green feels: happy, sad, mad 




Follow up: (Re-read the 
prompt.) You said that 
Green felt _____. Tell me 
more about Green feeling 
_______. (After response) 
Is there anything more you 
would like to say about 






































Green is in line at the water 
fountain and Red gets in 
front of Green without 
asking. How do you think 
Green feels: happy, sad, mad 




































Green was riding a tricycle 
down a big hill and it started 
going faster than Green 
wanted. How do you think 
Green feels: happy, sad, mad 








































Red made a nice card for a 
friend, Green. Green likes 
the card a lot. How do you 
think Green feels: happy, 
























Green’s grandfather died. 
How do you think Green 
















scared, or no feeling? 
# of 
participants 































Green’s parents are yelling at 
each other in the other room. 
Green can hear them and 
thinks they are fighting. How 
do you think Green feels: 


































At the park, Green’s mother 
bought an ice cream. Green 
took one lick and 
accidentally dropped the ice 
cream cone. How do you 
think Green feels: happy, 
sad, mad scared, or no 
feeling? 
Follow up: (Re-read the 
prompt.) You said that 
Green felt _____. Tell me 
more about Green feeling 
_______. (After response) 
Is there anything more you 
would like to say about 




































Green brings a favorite 
candy bar to school and it is 
in the book bag. Another 
child sees the candy bar, 
takes it and eats it. How do 
you think Green feels: 





































Green is playing in the 
woods with Red. Red runs 
away and leaves Green alone 
in the woods. It is getting 
dark. How do you think 
Green feels: happy, sad, mad 
scared, or no feeling? 
Follow up: (Re-read the 
prompt.) You said that 
Green felt _____. Tell me 
more about Green feeling 
_______. (After response) 
Is there anything more you 
would like to say about 



































It is the first day of school. 
Red and Green are friends 
and have not seen each other 
all summer. Now Green sees 
Red in class. How do you 
think Green feels: happy, 
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Please go to the highlighted items and say:  “That was good. Now I would like to 
go back to a few of these.  I will read them to you again, and tell you the feeling that 
you said.  I would like you to tell me more about the feeling to help me understand 
what you are thinking.  Shall we try?”  
 
Write down verbatim what the child says in the space below.  Just in case, please tape 











Emotion Identification (EID) 
Participant Number __________ 
    
I’m going to show you some pictures of children and I want you to tell me how they 
feel.  Tell me if you think they look happy, sad, mad, or scared.  Sometimes you might 
think they look like they have two feelings, like both mad and sad.  If you think they 
have two feelings, tell me both (If they say two, circle both.  Then follow up by asking 
“which feeling is stronger” and mark the selected one with an asterisk). Sometimes 
the child in the picture may not look like any feeling, and you can tell me that by 
saying, "no feeling."  Don't say "no feeling" just because you're not sure how they 
look, though.  If you think they look like any feeling, I want you to take a guess at 
what it is, okay?(When you show each picture, prompt: Do you think he/she is happy, 




Happy Sad Mad Scared NF 
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3 
Item 11 1 pt. 1 pt. 
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Appendix E: Variables in Analysis and Research Questions 
 





Analyses Q1 Q2 Q3 
Age in 
months ✔ ✔    
School ✔ ✔    
Teacher ✔ ✔    






subtest ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
NEPSY-II 
TOM 
subtest ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 




subtest  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
SSIS-
Parent ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
SSIS-
Teacher ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 
Research Questions and Related Analyses 
Purpose Analyses 
 




Mean, Standard deviations, Frequency 
and Ranges on key independent and 
dependent variables . 
PQ2.What variables should be controlled for in the MR analyses?  






Exploratory analysis to identify variables 
that should be controlled for.  Identify 
possible nested levels using ICC. Screen 
for impact of gender, age in months, and 
vocabulary on variables of interest using 
zero-order correlations and spearman 
correlations. 
 
An ICC between School and SSIS 
teacher was calculated to determine the 
need for a multi-level model. ICC’s 
between School and SSIS teacher 
subtests were also be run for 
exploratory purposes. 
 
Correlations between: a) Vocabulary 
and TAT, b) Vocabulary and ToM, c) 
School and Teacher, d) Age in months 
and ECT subtests and combined, e) 
Gender and SSIS-T and f) Gender and 
SSIS-P 
 
RQ1. Are situationistic EU and mentalistic EU distinct constructs? How do 
they relate to each other and to external correlates?  
 
H1a) There is a low or non-significant 
correlation between situationistic and 
mentalistic EU.  
 
H1b) Situationistic and mentalistic EU has 
distinct relations to external correlates 
when controlling for vocabulary—
mentalistic EU relates to ToM but 
situationistic emotion understanding does 
not.  
 
H1c) Mentalistic EU and situationistic EU 
relate differently to various subcategories 
of social competence within the SSIS. 
Mentalistic EU relates to Engagement, 
Empathy, Responsibility, and 
Externalizing subscales on the SSIS, 
whereas situationistic EU relates to the 
Communication, Cooperation and 
Internalizing subscales. 
 
Pearson correlation of ECT and ToM. 




Partial correlation of ECT and ToM and 
TAT and 




Pearson correlation of ECT-combined 
test  and SSIS subscales 
 
Pearson correlation of TAT and SSIS 
subscales 
 
RQ2. When taken together, do ECT, TAT, and ToM, predict a significant 
amount of variation teacher rated social competence even when 




H2) Mentalistic EU, situationistic EU and 
ToM account for a significant amount of 
variance in teacher-rated social 
competence when controlling for 
vocabulary. 
 
MR Step 1:  
Vocabulary 
 
MR Step 2: 




RQ3. Will mentalistic EU be a significant predictor of teacher rated 
social competence? 
H3) Mentalistic EU will be a significant 
predictor in the model of teacher rated 
social competence. 
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